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DISCOVERING DISCOVERY: NON-PARTY 
ACCESS TO PRETRIAL INFOR TION IN 
. . 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 1938-2006 
SEYMOUR MOSKOWITZ* 
In the modern era, the pretrial process is critical to the 
disposition of almost all litigation. The vast majority of 
cases never go to trial. Those which are contested at trial 
and upon appeal are often decided upon the results of the in-
formation gather before trial. This is true in both private 
litigation and in public interest cases where 'private attor-
neys general" may only function effectively with court-
enforced discovery. Despite the significance of the Article III 
courts to our society, transparency in their processes for re-
solving civil disputes has been severely compromised. 
Threats to openness emanate from multiple sources. 
This article considers the legal history and case law of one 
aspect of openness in th.e federal .courts: public access to dis-
cov.ery material gathered by parties engaged .in federal liti-
gation. The public, the press, researchers, and various others 
have legitimate interests in this information. This right 
should include pretrial material unprotected by valid protec-
tive orders issued under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
INTRODUCTION 
De Tocqueville noted in the 1840's that law, lawyers and 
the legal system are peculiarly central in·gre.dients in the func-
tioning of American democracy. "Scarcely any political question 
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, 
into a judicial question."l Major public policy issues are rou-
* Seymour Moskowitz, B.A., Columbia University; J.D. Harvard Law 
School; Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. My thanks to Pro-
fessor Tom Rowe, Duke Law School, for guidance and inspiration on this project; 
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tinely decided within the context of civil litigation in the United 
States. Brown v. Board of Education2 and its progeny are clas-
sic examples. More recent battles have included: the liability of 
tobacco companies to smokers and to governments for s.moking 
related illnesses,3 damages to consumers of pharmaceutical 
products, the lethal combination of Ford Explorer vehicles and 
Bridgestone/Firestone tires, and corporate governance issues 
impactin.g entire. industrie.s.4 
In the modern era, the pretrial process is critical to the 
disposition of almost all litigation. The vast majority of cases 
never go to trial. Those which are contested at trial and upon 
appeal are often decided upon the results of the information 
gathered before trial. This is true in both private litigation and 
in public interest cases where "private attorneys general" may 
only function effectively with court-enforced discovery. 5 
Despite the significance of the Article III courts to our soci· 
• 
ety, transparency_ in their processes for resolving civil disputes 
has been severely compromised. Threats to openness emanate 
from multiple sources. While civil trials are normally open to 
the public and the press,6 only a minute number of the cases 
Vintage Books 1945) (1795). 
2. 347 u.s. 4.83 (1954). 
3. See generally CARRICK MOLLENKAMP ET AL., THE PEOPLE VS. BIG 
. . 
TOBACCO: HOW THE STATES TOOK ON THE CIGARETTE GIANTS (1998). 
4. See, e.g., Mark Curriden, Power of 12, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2001, at 36 (catalog-
ing and describing litigation involving Fen-phen, Tylenol and other drugs, HMOs; 
children's pajamas, and numerous other cases forcing businesses and government 
to change the way they operate). 
5. At the federal level, Patrick Higginbotham has observed: 
Congress has elected to use the private suit, private attorneys·general as 
an enforcing mechanism: for the-anti-trust laws, the security laws, envi· 
ronmentalla ws, civil rights and more. In the main, the plaintiff in these 
suits must discover his evidence from the defendant. Calibration of dis-
. . . 
covery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by 
Congress. 
Patrick Higginbotham, Foreward, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997). 
. . 
6. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly extended the First 
Amendment right of access to civil proceedings, it has acknowledged a history of 
access, and lower courts actually have recognized such a right. Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) ("Whether the public has a 
right to attend trials of civil cases is a question not raised by this case, but we 
note that historically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively 
open."); see, e.g., Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1073-74 (3d Cir~ 
1984) (holding that in corporate proxy litigation, the district court should not have 
denied the public, including two newspaper companies; access to portions of a 
hearing and its transcripts based on both common law and a constitutional right 
of public access to civil trials). 
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entering the federal court system are tried. 7 The vast bulk of 
cases are resolved by negotiated settlements· often not filed in 
court at all, or filed and sealed8 or decided by dispositive pre-
trial motions.9 Since 1980, little-noticed procedural rule 
c'hanges have made the most important p·arts of the discovery 
process a private preserve. Aggregation of similar cases10 and 
multi-district litigation increase the significance of these 
trends .. 
In addition, increasingly numerous alternate dispute reso-
lution (''ADR") processes e.g., court ordered mediation andlor 
arbitration operate outside public view or knowledge. II These 
mechanisms often keep disputes from entering the c.ourt sys-
tem. Contractually enforced ADR, including consumer or em-
ployment complaints, can hide patterns of abuse by a corpora-
tion or an entire industry.l2 These and other processes rob the 
7. Paul W. Mollica, Federal Summary Judgment at High Tide, 84 MARQ. L. 
REV~ 141, 141 (2000) ("The percentage of civil cases proceeding to trial in the fed-
eral courts plunged from 8.5%. of all pending civil cases in [1973] to just 2.3% in 
[1999]."); see also Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B~A. J., Oct. 2002, 
at 24, 26 (comparing ten percent of civil cases filed in 1970 that resulted in trial 
with 2.2% in 2001). 
8. One insurance defense attorney noted he had not "put a settlement to-
gether in the past five to six years tha,t [lacked] a confidentiality clause.'; Blanca 
Fromm, Comment: Bringing SeUlement Out of the Shadows.: Information About 
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 676 (2001) (quoting 
California lawyer Glenn Gilsleider). 
9. Mollica, supra note 7~ at 143-44 (reviewing twenty volumes of the Federal 
Reporter from 1973 and from 1997-98 and reporting a marked increase in sum-
mary dispositions of civil cases). 
I 0. See Howard M. Erichson, Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical 
Implications of Coordination Among Counsel in /lelated Laws.uits, 50 DUKE L.J. 
381 (2000) (describing formal and informal methods of aggregating claims and de· 
fenses of related cases). 
11. ADR emerged in the 1970's in both optional and mandatory forms. In 
1978, Congress approved three court-annexed arbitration programs for federal 
district courts. See Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected 
ADR: A Critique of Federal Court 4 Annexed Arbi.tration Programs, 141 U. PA. L . 
• 
REV. 2169, 2172 (1993). The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
(JIAJA) established a general structure for the federal court-annexed arbitration 
program. ld. at 2177. In these proceedings, the federal rules of evidence are in-
applicable, and there is no requirement that arbitrators issue findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. Id. at ·2181. If a party in arbitration fails to request a trial 
within thirty days of the arbitrator's decision, the conclusions bear the same force 
as a trial judgment and may not be appealed. Id. at 2185. Most districts also re-
quire the party requesting a trial to post bond for the arbitrator~s fees and .costs. 
Id. at 2183. 
12. See Corporate Responsibility: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer 
Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, 
and Transportation, 108th Cong. 19 (2002) (statement of Joan Claybrook, Presi· 
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public of a crucial function of the judicial process: bringing to 
light issues of vital public interest that could otherwise be hid· 
den from view by powerful private parties)3 The effects of 
these developments have been profound. 
This article considers the legal history and case law of an-
other aspect of ope.nness in the federal courts: public access to 
discovery material gathered by parties engaged in federal liti-
gation. The public, the press, researchers, and various others 
have legitimate interests in this information absent considera-
tions warranting the entry of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
2614 protective order. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc.,I5 the Supreme Court recognized a right to inspect and 
copy public records and documents. This right should include 
pretrial material unprotected by valid Rule 26 prote,ctive or-
ders. Underlying this right are important policies. ensuring 
public health and safety, promoting public respect for the judi-
cial process, and assuring that judges perform their duties in 
an honest and informed manner.I6 Unelected and given life 
tenure, federal judges are only truly accountable. through pub-
lic and professional scrutiny of their decisions. 
Although courts have a number of internal checks, such as 
appellate review by multi-judge tribunals, professional and 
public monitoring is an essential feature of democratic con-
troL Monitoring both provides judges with critical views of 
their work and deters arbitrary judicial behavior. Without 
monitoring, moreover, the public could have no confidence 
in the conscientiousness, reasonableness, or honesty of judi-
. l d. 17 c1a procee 1ngs. 
A close examination of the history of Rule 5 and the case 
law surrounding public access reveals a complicated set of legal 
dent~ Public Citizen, testifying that financial companies were forcing ,consumers to 
arbitrate claims of securities fraud, hiding widespread abuse by the industry). 
13. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (Hereinafter, specific rules will be referred to as ''Rule 
__ '").; 
15. 435 u.s. 589, 597 (1978). 
16. Republic of the Phillipines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 660, 
664 (3d Cir. 1991). 
' 17. United States v. Amodeo; 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995). See also 
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989) (without access 
to documents that lead to "full understanding" of a proceeding, public would not 
be in a "position to serve as an effective check on the system"). 
20071 DISCOVERING DISCOVERY 821 
principles and an evolving jurisprudence. Part I discusses the 
significance of access to information obtained through discov-
ery. This section examines the value of having third parties 
obtain pretrial materials and the interests of litigants, particu-
larly defendants, in shielding such information from public 
view. Part II examines the history of the development of mod-
ern discovery in the federal courts. In 1938, the newly-created 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (''FRCPu) provided the oppor-
. 
tunity to obtain relevant information before trial concerning 
claims and defenses. Beginning in the 1970s, cross-cutting 
trends, often based upon a perception of "discovery abuse"18 
substantially limited these opportunities. Part III relates the 
history of Rule 5, specifically focusing on the requirement to 
file discovery materials in court. The little noticed 2000 
amendment to Rule 5 now prohibits filing discovery except 
upon specific court order, reversing the prior position of that 
Rule. Part IV surveys federal case law pertaining to public ac-
cess to pretrial information during the _periods when Rule 5 re .. 
fleeted these various filing requirements. In addition, this sec-
tion examines federal court response to access arguments 
based upon common law or First Amendment claims. The Ar-
ticle concludes with a recommendation that Rule 5 should re-
turn to its pre-2000 form, requiring filing of discovery material 
except where a court relieves the parties of this obligation. Not 
only would this encourage balanced procedural decision. mak-
ing on access something Rule 26 protectiv-e order jurispru-
dence already requires but also protect the interests of unrep-
resented parties and the public. 
18. See American Bar Ass'n, ABA Litigation Section Special Committee on 
Abuse of Discovery: Report to the Bench and Bar, 92 F.R.D. 137 (1977) (recom-
mending limits on scope of discovery use of various discovery devices, and more 
judge·managed discovery); Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for 
the Twenty·First Century: Toward a New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT;L & COMP. 
L., 153t 161-62 (1999) (surveying post·1970 efforts at discovery containment). 
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I. ACCESS TO INFORMATION GATHERED DURING PRE-TRIAL 
PROCEDURES 
As far back as 1933, asbestos claims were routinely sealed 
by courts upon request of defendants, depriving workers and 
others of knowledge of preventable injuries. 19 In cases involv-
ing drugs and defective products, the dissemin.ation of vital in-
formation relevant to public health and safety has often been 
blocked.2o In January 2002, the Boston Globe reported that for 
more than ten years, the Archdioces.e of Boston secretly settled 
child molestation claims against at least seventy priests.21 Af~ 
ter the Boston Globe published its investigative report, hun-
dreds of new victims came forward and reports across the coun-
try surfaced of priests' sexual abuse and misconduct.22 
Bridgestone and Firestone employed judge-enforced confidenti-
ality orders in cases across America to hide information about 
injuries and deaths linked with the tread separation of their 
tires. As a result, for nearly a decade, the public and govern-
• 
ment agencies had little inkling· of the issue and consumers 
continued to buy the potentially deadly tires. 23 • 
19. PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON 
TRIAL 113 et seq. (1985) {describing the aftermath of early asbestos settlements); 
Coalition for Consumer Rights, Secrets that Kill: Dangers Buried in the Court-
house, Mar. 2000. 
20. See Courts Secrecy, Its Impact on Public Health and Safety, and the-Sun-
shine in Litigation Act: Hearing on S. 1404 Before the S. Judiciary Comm. on 
. . 
Courts and Administrative Practice, 103d Cong. (1994) (detailing consequences of 
denying public access to discovery in, and settlement of, cases involving the Shiley 
heart value, Prozac_" and numerous other products). 
21. Walter V. Robinson, Scores of Priests Involved in Sex Abuse Cases Settle-
ments Kept Scope of Issue Out of Public Eye, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at Al. 
22. Walter V. Robinson, Hundreds Now Claim Priest Abuse, Lawyers Report 
Flood of Alleged New Victims, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 24, -2002, at Al; Brooks Eger-
ton & Reese Dunklin, Bishops' Record in Cases of Accused Priests, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, June 12, 2002, at 24A (reporting accusations of pedophilia, sex-
ual abuse, or harassment by priests in forty-one states). 
23. Between 1992 and 2000, 271 people died in accidents linked to Ford Ex-
plorer/Firestone Tire failure and more than 800 were seriously injured. See Class 
Act-ion Status Given to Ford and Firestone Suits, N.Y. TIMES; Nov. 29, 2001, at C4. 
For more than eight years, Bridgstone/Firestone Tires had been negotiating confi-
dentiality agreements with respect to information regarding the lethal combina-
tion of the Ford Explorer Sport Utility Vehicles and its tires. See, e.g., Sealed 
Court Records Kept Tire Problems Hidden, USA TODAY, Sept. 19, 2000, at 16A. 
Many of the individual cases were transferred to the Indiana District Court han-
dling these consolidated cases and an agreement requiring secrecy was required of 
anyone wishing to share in the discovery. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 198 
F.R.D. 654, 657 (S.D. Ind. 2001). Eventually the discovery documents were leaked 
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Among the common problems in these and other cases is 
the lack of access to materials gathered in discovery and the 
secret settlements of cases involving a wide variety of legal 
wrongs.24 While courts undoubtedly exist to resolve disputes 
between private parties,25 the judicial branch is an integral 
public institution, no more or less so than the executive or leg-
-islative branches. Therefore, the work of courts should be open 
unless specific and compelling reasons exist to draw a curtain 
in front of their operations. Only an open judicial branch can 
preserve public trust and foster effective monitoring.26 The 
Supreme Court has noted "[p]eople in an open society do not 
demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for 
them to accept w'hat they are prohibited from observing."27 
Moreover, many cases in American courts have a distinctly 
public nature. As Judge Posner has noted, "[t]he parties to a 
lawsuit are not the only people who have a legitimate-interest 
in the record compiled in a legal proceeding/'28 This public na-
to the press and showed how many tire/tread separations had been reported to 
Firestone. See Keith Bradsher,. Documents Show Firestone Knew of Rising War-
ranty Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2000, at Cl. The secrecy enforced with respect to 
discovery and settlement delayed the recall of these tires for years. See Thomas 
A. Fogarty, Can Courts' Cloak of Secrecy Be Deadly?, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2000, 
at lB. 
24. With respect to secret settlements, see S.C. FED. DIST. LOCAL R. 5.03; 
Laurie Kratky Dore~ Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in 
the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAM:E L. REV. 283 (1999). 
25. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality~ Protective Orders, and Public Access to 
the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 428, 431 (1991) (contending court's "primary mis-
sion" is to resolve disputes among litigants); Richard L . Marcus, The Discovery 
Confidentia.lity Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457, 469-70 (1991) (arguing 
primary role of courts is to resolve disputes and decide cases, not to "give expres-
sion to 'public values"'). 
26. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing a 
general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial 
records and documents); In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F .R.D. 45 
(E.D. Mich. 1985). 
Access to pretrial documents furthers several important functional goals 
of society. Court proceedings can be evaluated by individuals who are in-
formed about the issues. Access to pretrial documents lessens the likeli· 
hood of private or public graft or judicial ignorance. Pretrial access to in-
formation helps the p.ublic better understand judicial proceedings and 
public confidence in the judicial system as a whole can be enhanced. 
These functional needs of society must be balanced against the func· 
tional needs of the judicial system. As a result, the scope of public access 
may need to be narrowed and its timing deferred. 
Id. at 54. 
27. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia~ 448 U.S. 555, 57.2 (1980). 
28. Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 
• 
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ture of litigation emerges in a variety of contexts: (a) private 
suits involving product safety, corporate governance, and other 
issues of concern to society;29 (b) suits by or against govern-
ment or government agencies;30 (c) class actions and other rep-
resentative actions, which, by definition, involve the specific 
substantive rights of large groups of people;31 and (d) "private 
attorney general" suits ''to prevent [a government] official from 
acting in violation of his statutory powers."32 
There may be legitimate reasons, e.g., trade secrets or 
highly personal information, to restrict access to the informa-
tion gathered in litigation. In these instances, parties may 
seek a protective order to keep the results confidential. This is 
expressly permitted by Rule 26, but the moving party must 
show good cause as to why an order should be granted.33 Par-
ties often agree to such protective orders, and, as a result, a ju-
944 (7th Cir. 1999). 
29. See products and events described supra notes 2-4 and accompanying 
text. 
30. See, e.g., Mullins v. City of Griffin, 886 F. Supp. 21, 22-23 (N.D. Ga. 1995) 
(holding municipality not entitled to a protective order of confidentiality of set-
tlement in civil rights lawsuit filed against it). 
31. The public nature of these actions is represented by Rule 23(d)(2), which 
provides that a court may require that the class receive notice and an opportunity 
to intervene in various aspects of the litigation, and Rule 23(e), which requires 
class members to be notified of proposed dismissal or compromise. FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(d)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
32. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 
1943), cert. granted, 319 U.S. 739 (1943), order vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943). 
These cases typically involve a statutory cause of action granted to individuals 
injured by conduct Congress wishes to proscribe, often combined with statutory 
attorney fees for the prev~iling plaintiff. In this content, the public nature of s~ch 
a suit exists even when a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages rather than sim-
ply injunctive relief. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters, 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968) 
(per curiam). "Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights plaintiff seeks to 
vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in 
monetary terms." City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986). 
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) identifies eight kinds of protective orders 
that a district court might issue, but the list is nonexclusive and courts have wide 
discretion to order other appropriate discovery restriction. Such an order is ap-
propriate where ''justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." See CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 2036 (2d ed, 1997) (quoting FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26(c)); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (noting that 
"trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the competing needs and inter-
ests of parties affected by discovery''). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, 
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settle-
ment (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2684 (1995) (addressing privacy issues 
in settlement of cases). 
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dicial examination of whether good cause actually exists never 
takes place. Despite initial agreement, one of the parties may 
seek relief from, or third parties may intervene to challenge, 
such private agreements.34 Absent a protective order, a plain-
tiff or defendant has the right to disseminate information ob-
tained during discovery so long as the purpose for sharing is 
lawful.35 Moreover, if the discovery is filed in court, as Rule 5 
required for many years, the information is publicly available. 
Although parties, particularly plaintiffs, may be willing to 
trade access to pre·trial information for litigation or monetary 
concessions by defendants, this does not answer the fundamen-
tal question. When there is a demonstrable public interest in 
the information in question, a party may have no right to sell 
nondisclosure.36 It is the federal court discovery rules,-
34. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 
1987); San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. District Court, 187 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 
1999). 
35. Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 209 F.R.D. 201, 205 (D. Colo. 2002) (''Par-
ties to litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate information they 
obtained in discovery absent a valid protective order."); Federal Trade Comm'n v. 
Digital Interactive Assocs., Inc., 1996 WL 912156 (D. Colo. 1996) (emphasizing 
that in ruling on motion for a protective order, court "begins with the premise that 
a party to litigation has a Constitutionally protected right to disclose the fruits of 
discovery to non parties absent a valid protective order entered by a court"); 
Oklahoma Hosp. Ass'n v. Oklahoma Publ'g. Co., 7 48 F.2d 1421, 1424 (lOth Cir. 
1984) (noting constitutionally protected right to disseminate information obtained 
through discovery); Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 683-84 (5th Cir. 
1985) ("A party may generally do what it wants with material obtained through 
the discovery process, as long as it wants to do something legal."). 
36. See generally Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information 
Learned in Discovery Legal, Illegal or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
783 (2002) (analyzing arguments against contracting for secrecy in federal litiga-
tion). Even confidentiality duties imposed on professionals are abrogated under 
certain circumstances. For example, communications between attorneys and 
their clients are protected, but societal interests may override these duties where 
public health or safety is involved. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L&R § 4503, 4505 
(McKinney 1992). A "compelling interest in public health" takes precedence, for 
example, over the attorney-client privilege claimed by the defendant in written 
communications between counsel and firm executives. Sackman v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 357, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated, 167 F.R.D. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(reversed to permit interveners to be heard on discoverability of the documents in 
question). See also Leonen v. Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 100 (D.N.J. 1990). 
Indeed, lawyers are not alone in this duty to sometimes disclose information that 
may have come into their possession. Physician-patient privileges and employer-
employee confidentiality contracts are analogous. See, e.g., Brillantes v. Superior 
Court of L.A. County, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding state's 
.. 
interest in fraud investigation outweighed doctor privilege); People v. Bhatt, 611 
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (recognizing exception to privilege in context of 
Medicare fraud investigations); McCormick on Evidence, at 225. 
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including protective orders which govern the obligation to 
produce information. Even in the case of trade secrets, "a privi-
lege to disclose may ... be given by the law, independently of 
the [owner's] consent, in order to promote some public inter-
est."37 Once discovery is filed in court, it should be available 
unless sealed by a neutral judge. Unfortunately, stipulated pro-
tective orders are often approved pro-forma by overburdened 
courts anxious to avoid time consuming inquiries into discovery 
disputes. 
Opponents of public access to discovery information often 
claim that this potential availability will make court proceed-
ings dramatically slower and more expensive.38 Defendants, in 
particular, may arguably resist more forcibly discovery re-
quests, diverting court time to collateral matters. This argu-
ment is overstated. First, contemporary discovery is already 
often a brass knuckled affair. Each request for information is 
typically treated as narrowly as possible, every claim of privi-
lege or irrelevance is asserted as broadly as possible. 39 
The general principle guiding discovery requests for docu-
ments is that defense counsel may not flatly lie or hide 
documents, but they are entitled to be "aggressive," make 
the plaintiffs lawyer "work for what he wants," and with-
hold from relieving the plaintiffs' lawyers of the burden of 
preparing his own case.40 
Second, even more important, open discovery files in appropri-
ate circumstances are consistent with the modern trend to have 
37. RESTATEMENT OF'TORTS § 757 cmt. d (1939). See Lachman v. Sperry-Son 
Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 854 (lOth Cir. 1972) (while nondisclosure 
agreement in contract proper, public policy prevented enforcement). The Re-
statement (Second) of Agency likewise recognizes that the duty of loyalty, owed by 
an agent to a principal, includes a privilege to reveal confidential information nec-
essary to protect "a superior interest of himself or of a third person." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 395 cmt. f (1957). 
38. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 25, at 484 ("public access would disrupt or-
derly trial preparation by fomenting opposition to broad discovery''). 
39. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Prelimi-
nary Observations, 67 FORDHAM. L. REV. 709, 712 (1998). 
40. ld. See also Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of 
Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 17, 18-19 (1988) (opining that discovery 
"gives impetus and opportunity to the baser litigational instincts of delay, decep-
tion, and unbridled confrontational advocacy''). "Where the object always is to 
beat every plowshare into a sword, the discovery procedure is employed variously 
as weaponry." MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 18 (1980). 
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judges manage caseloads to prevent delay and reduce costs.41 
As case man,agers, judges need information provided by filed 
discovery, and statutory reform has magnified this function.42 
The Manual for Complex Litigation recommends sharing 
discovery materia1,43 which promotes efficiency and fairness.44 
Information sharing avoids duplication of effort and allows re-
finement in the language of discovery requests, achieving 
greater accuracy and specificity.- Similarly situated claimants 
and defendants may pool documents, including deposition -and 
trial transcripts, share research and availability of experts, and 
create other economic efficiencies. Defendants routinely en-
gage in joint efforts,45 and there are now well-publicized exam-
ples of plaintiffs using similar tactics.46 The significance of 
third-party access to pretrial materials may also be inferred 
from the very aggressive efforts by d,efendants to block dis-
semination of discovery information.47 Third parties often ac-
cept the confidentiality conditions agreed to by the original liti-
gants in order to re-ceive information needed for their own 
cases. Such a coerced choice should not be permitted. 
Finally, secrecy proponents often note that local federal 
district courts had promulgated rules barring or excusing par-
41. See FED. R. -CIV. P. 16{b) (requiring judges to set time limits for certain 
events in all cases except those exempted by local rule). 
42. See S. REP. No. 101-416, at 16 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6803, 6819. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee, from which the CJRA 
emanated, explains that the Act was to increase the ''benefits of enhanced case 
management" because "greater and earlier judicial control over civil cases yields 
faster rates of disposition._" Id. See also JAMES S. K.AKALIK ET AL., AN 
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 
ACT 3 (1996) (evaluating statutorily mandated case expense and delay plans). 
43. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 21.432 (noting that "sub-
stantial savings in time and expense may often been achieved"). 
44. FED. R,. CIV. P. 1 ("just,- speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action" are the objectives of the federal rules-of civil procedure). See also United 
Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co.~ 905 F.2d 14-24, 1427-28 (lOth Cir. 1990) (al-
lowing access to discovery in the interest of '"saving time-and effort in the collat-
eral case"). 
45. Erichson, supra note 10, at 401-08 (outlining defense attorneys' coordina· 
tion of strategy and sharing of information in a wide variety of cases and con-
texts). 
46. ld. at 386--96. 
47. See, e.g., Stuart E. Rickerson, Corporate Counsel's Guide to the New Rules, 
61 DEF. COUNS. J. 192, 196 (1994) (maintaining that pursuit of protective orders 
is advisable for defendants); Daniel Boyd Smith, Anti·Dissemination Orders in 
Product Liability Suits, 5 AM-. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 507, 512 (1982) (describing defen-
dant's attempts to curtail dissemination of information) . 
• 
828 ~-...IT'Y OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
ties from filing discovery materials unless ordered to do so, 
even while Rule 5(d) required filing. While there were many of 
these local rules,48 their validity was suspect. Since its prom-
ulgation in 1938, Rule 83 forbade district court initiatives in-
consistent with the national rules.49 Despite this, local rules 
often deviated from the federal rules in many particulars. Dur-
ing the 1980s, the Judicial Conference inaugurated a Local 
Rules Project to compile information about this phenomenon.50 
The report questioned the authority of district courts to order 
that discovery material not be filed and concluded such rules or 
orders are only permitted when strong public or private inter-
ests compel waiving the filing requirement. 51 
The issue of whether discovery was to be filed in court was 
openly and vigorously debated during the consideration of a 
proposed amendment to Rule 5(d) in 1978 and explicitly re-
jected by the final changes implemented in 1980.52 The 1980 
amendment did provide courts the opportunity to dispense with 
filing in an individual case, rather than on a general basis. 53 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL COURTS 
Access by parties in a lawsuit to information held by oth-
ers modern discovery has not always been available. The 
English common law system was characterized by rigid, writ-
dominated pleadings, restricted parties, and limited issues. 
48. See Marcus, supra note 25, at 466, n.56 {listing local rules permitting par~ 
ties not to file some or all discovery rna terials in court unless so ordered by the 
court or if materials are needed in connection with motion proceeding). 
49. Original Rule 83 provided that "[e]ach district court by action of a major-
ity of the judges thereof may from time to time make and amend rules governing 
its practice not inconsistent with these rules." WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 33, at § 
3151 n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting original Rule 83). 
50. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the U.S., Report of the Local Rules Project (1988) [hereinafter "Local Rules 
Project Report"] (finding approximately 5,000 local rules and concluding many 
conflicted with the national rules). See, e.g., A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experi-
ments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1572 (1991) 
(finding "rampant inconsistency between local and national rules"). In addition, 
Congress, in 1988, revised the statutory provisions on local rule and required each 
federal appellate court, through its judicial counsel, to examine and regulate local 
rules of districts courts within its circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c) (1988). 
51. See Local Rules Project Report, supra note 50, at 1-7. The Local Rules 
Project urged the Advisory Committee to consider amending the federal rule. Id. 
at 92. 
52. 
53. 
See infra Part IV. C. 
FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d). 
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These restrictions undergirded a court proce_ss structurally an-
tithetical to information gathering tools. In "legal'' cases, par-
ties had to identify the specific materials they sought in discov-
ery.54 Even under Field Codes in American states, a plaintiff 
could not begin discovery unless he or she could independently 
substantiate facts stated in a complaint. 55 There was little op-
portunity· to examine documents that might be relevant and 
useful, or to use depositions:, interrogatories, or other informa-
tion gathering tools56 to facilitate the proof of an existing or 
new theory of the case.57 In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court de-
nounced as a ''fishing bill" any effort by a party to "pry into the 
case of his adversary to learn its strength or weakness."58 On 
the other hand, the practice·s in equity courts provided the ba-
sis for modern discovery devices. 59 
The adoption of the FRCP in 1938 marked a new approach 
and epoch. Charles Clark, former President of the Association 
of American Law Schools and the drafter of the Federal Rules 
was fond of quoting Frankfurter: ''[n]ew winds are blowing on 
old doctrines, the critical spirit infiltrates traditional formu-
las .. . . "60 The Federal Rules simplified pleading,61 liberalized 
joinder of parties and claims,62 and emphasized ease of litiga-
54. See 6 JAMES WM-. MOORE, ET AL., MOORE'S 'FEDERAL PRACTICE § 26 (3d ed. 
2001) (describing discovery procedures at common law). 
55. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2241 (1989). "Un-
der the codes, a plaintiff could not even get into discovery unless she could inde· 
pendently substantiate such suspicions, for substantiation had to be manifested in 
a complaint that stated 'facts."' Id. In his 1928 work on code pleadings, Professor 
Clark described twenty·eight states as having adopted the Field Code; none of the 
remaining jurisdictions still adhered completely to common law pleading. 
CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 19-20 (1928). 
56. See generally GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL (1932) 
(describing discovery devices and procedures used in various American jurisdic-
tions in 1932). 
57. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. IlL 
1979) ("[T]he heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business 
documents. Without them, there is virtually no case."). 
58. Carpenter v. Winn; 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911). 
59. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed.~ The His-
torical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691 
(1998). 
60. Charles Clark, What Now?, Address of the President of the Association of 
American Law Schools at the arst Annual Meeting (December 28 .. 30, 1933), in 20 
A.B.A J. 431, 432 (1934) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, The Early Writings of 0. W. 
Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1931)). 
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. 
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 13, 14, 18-24; Stephen N. Subrin~ How Equity Conquered 
• 
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tion rather than technical legal pleading. These changes in the 
pretrial process were mutually reinforcing. Gene.rally, notice 
pleading ha.d to be supplemented by open discovery. Another 
major theoretical and practical feature of the 1938 procedural 
revolution was elimination of varied pleading requirements for 
different types of cases. Professor Clark insisted that princi-
ples of uniformity and simplicity· and the merger of law and eq-
uity required the same rules for all cases. 63 
Most scholars give the credit for the innovative discovery 
concepts embodied in the FRCP to Professor Edson R. Sunder-
land.64 Sunderland was a scholar engaged in the real world. 
He. had consistently advocated expanding discovery te.ch-
niques.65 Professor Subrin notes that the initial draft of the 
Federal Rules distributed for public comment "included every 
type of discovery that was known in the United States and 
probably England up to that time."66 Responding to. this new 
spirit, the Supreme Court wrote in 1946: 
No longer can the time~honored cry of 'fishing expedition' 
serve to preclude a party from inquiring into the facts un-
derlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all the 
.· 
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation. 67 
The original Federal Rules, however, still had significant 
limits upon discovery.. Production and examination of docu-
Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 
U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982-91 (1987). 
63. See ADVISORY COMM. TRANSCRIPT (Nov. 14, 1935), noted in Subrin, supra 
note 62, at 977. 
64. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 59, at 734, 736. 
65. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before 
Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863 (1933). 
66. Subrin, supra note 59, at 718. 
If one adds up all of the types of discovery permitted in individual state 
courts, one finds some precursors to what later became discovery under 
the Federal Rules; but ~ .. no one state allowed the total panoply of de-
vices. Moreover, the Federal Rules, as they became law in 1938, elimi· 
nated features of discovery that in some states had curtailed the scope of 
discovery and the breadth of its use. 
Id. at 719. 
67. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947); see also United States v. 
Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery together with the 
fair trial procedures make trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair 
contest). 
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ments, for example, were available only if ordered by the judge 
upon showing of "good cause."68 Over time, restraints on access 
to docum-ents were gradually limited,69 and other changes con· 
tinued to expand discovery. ln 1946, the Federal Rules were 
amended to make -clear that even inadmissible material was 
discoverable so long as it was "reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence."70 In 1948, the require-
ment of leave of court for taking depositions was eliminated71 
as were limits on the number or scope of interrogatories.72 At 
the same. time, the standard for do~ument production and in-
spection was eased from documents "material to the case'' to 
documents "related to the case .. "73 In 1970, insurance policies 
were explicitly made discoverable, 74 and enforcement of the· 
motion to compel was expanded to apply to all discovery de-
vices except mental and physical exams under Rule 35.75 
Liberalized discovery was consistent with the general 
trends in federal civil procedure. An opportunity to engage in 
meaningful pretrial information-gathering is the counterpart to 
notice pleading76 and an essential elem,ent in a just dispute 
68. AM. BAR ASS'N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES WITH NOTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 
74 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938). "Upon motion of any party showing good cause 
therefor and upon notice to all other parties, the court . ~ . may ... order any party 
to produce ... documents ~ .. which constitute or contain evidence material to any 
matter involved in the action .... " Id. (emphasis added). "Inspections [of docu-
ments] had always been strictly regulated by the court and the potential free in-
vasion of files had always been feared." WILLIAM GLASER, PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY 
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 33 (1968). 
69. In 1970, the requirement for prior judicial approval for docume.nt discov-
ery was removed entirely in the~ federal courts. See Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970). 
70. This language is now found at the end of FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). 
71. See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed 
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United 
States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 453 (1946). 
72. See id. at 461. 
73. ld. at 463. 
74. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating 
to Discovery~ 48 F.R.D. 487, 487 (1970). 
75. See id. at 538. 
76. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507-08 (holding discovery process provides informa-
tion for trial and pleadings merely give notice). The term ''notice pleading" may 
well be inaccurate because in actual court practice complaints (and counterclaims) 
must give "fair notice of what the plaintiffs claim is and the grounds upon which 
it rests." 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1202 (3d. ed. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 58 
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resolution system.77 Improved discovery creates better access 
to courts and facilitates greater social justice. Cases are no 
longer decided on "sporting" rules that allow s11tprise evidence 
and hidden traps for the unwary or· misled.78 The long struggle 
to establish the liability of the tobacco companies for damages 
caused to smokers, their public and private insurers, and the 
public would have been inconceivable without access to infor-
mation possessed mainly by the industry. The production of 
documents and/or electronically stored information is typically 
a plaintiffs best means of obtaining evidence to prove a case 
that would not be otherwise demonstrable or to transform 
merely compensatory damages into a punitive award. Equity-
derived access to information allows equity-derived remedies, 
developed for this purpose in institutional reform cases.79 
Since 1970, t<he tide has changed. The thrust of the 
amendments to the federal rules since then has been toward 
containing the cost and time expended on the exchange of pre-
trial information. In 1983, a clause in Rule 26(a), which previ-
ously provided that the frequent use of discovery mechanisms 
was not to be limited was deleted and a sentence was added to 
Rule 26(b) permitting courts to limit discovery. New Rule 26(g) 
encouraged judges to impose appropriate sanctions for discov-
ery abuse80 and explicitly b,arred disproportionate discovery.81 
In 1993, new automatic disclosure provisions were introduced, 
and explicit limits on depositions and interrogatories were codi-
fied. 82 Amendments to the federal rules expanded the role of 
(1957)). 
77. See, e.g., FED. ·n. CIV. P. 8(a); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957) 
(noting pretrial information gathering and issue defining are critical to the struc-
ture of modern litigation and these rest upon appropriate discovery methods). 
78. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 62, at 945. 
79. See Abraham Chayes,. The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292-96 (1976); Owen Fiss, The Social and Political Founda .. 
tions of Adjudication, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982) (describing ''structural 
reform" litigation and judges, particularly federal judges, who use historic equity 
powers to expand rights). 
80~ See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (advisory committee notes to the 1983 amend-
ments); Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Cost & Delay: the Potential Impact of the 
1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 JUDICATURE 363 
(1983). 
81. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
82. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d), 26(£). Rule 30 was revised to require leave of· 
court if more than ten depositions were, desired. Amended Rule aa limited the 
number of interrogatories to thirty. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 40 (1993). 
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jud-ges early in litigation by requirin-g the approval of discovery 
plans.83 The 2000 amendments went even further to restrict 
the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1).84 
The issue of access to pretrial information centers on Rule. 
5. Analysis of the debates over the text of Rule 5 between 1938 
and the present and federal court analysis of third party access 
to discovery materials shed considerable light on the strength 
of claims for openness. I turn next to those tasks. 
Ill. HISTORY OF RULE 5 AND FILING OF DISCOVERY 
A. The Initial Rule 
In the beginning, Congress created the Rules Enabling Act, 
authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of practice 
and procedure for the federal courts.85 Soon afterward, a com-
mittee of practitioners and academics produced a draft set of 
rules.. Among its innovative features was the orientation to-
ward the procedural rules used in equity .rather than in com-
mon law; this orientation included new means of obtainin-g in-
formation before trial. 
In 1936, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules submitted 
three drafts- of a rule designated Rule 6, which addressed ser-
vice and filing, with commentary on each draft.86 The following 
year, the Advisory Committee proposal appeared as Rule 5.87 
Rule 5. Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers 
(a) Service: When Required. Every order required by its 
terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to the original 
complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of nu-
. 
merous defendants, every written motion other than one 
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice; ap-
pearance, demand, offer of judgment, designation of record 
on appeal, and similar paper shall be served upon each of 
the parties affected thereby. 
83. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B). 
' . 
84.. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l) (information without leave of court now only 
available when "relevant to a claim or defense'-' of party in place of the prior 
broader "relevant to the subject matter" of the dispute). 
85. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2005). 
86. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 1142. 
87. Id.atn.l~ 
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(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be 
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either be-
fore service or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings 
and other p·apers with the court as required by these rules 
shall be made by filing them with the clerk of the 
·urt 88 co ·.. . .... 
The term "similar paper" in Rule 5(a) was intended to avoid a 
restrictive list of litigation papers required to be serve-d ·and 
hence filed in court, and this term was judicially construed to 
extend to a large variety of documents not specifically men-
tioned.89 Since its a.doption in 1938, Rule 5 has governed ser-
vice of all papers and pleadings subsequent to service of the 
summons and complaint (covered by Rule 4). As such, Rule 5 
focuses on the interchange of information between parties to a 
lawsuit and the orderly filing of those papers in court where 
access to the information may ·be obtained.90 
The original federal discovery rules contained variations 
that could result in different filing requirements. Rule 30 
(Depositions),91 Rule 33 (lnterrogatories),92 and Rule. 36 (Re-
quest for Admission)93 all explicitly required service on parties 
and filing in court, while Rule 34 (Document Inspections and 
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(a), (d)-(e) (1938) (emphasis added). 
89. See, e.g., In re Aucoin. 150 B.R. 644 (D. LA) (1993) (similar paper applied 
to Bankruptcy filings); In re Sasson Jeans, Inc. 86 B.R. 336 (D.N.Y. 1988) (bank~ 
ruptcy filings); Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. VTR, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 1309 (1975) 
(contempt proceedings). Rule 5 also required the service of papers on all parties 
'"affected there:by." This language later produced disputes regarding which parties 
were entitled to notice of proceedings taking place during the lawsuit and various 
documents. This problem was eliminated in 1963 by the deletion of the words "at· 
fected thereby'' in order to promote a "full exchange of information among the par-
ties." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 1142. 
90~ WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 1411, n.4. 
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 30{a) (1938). 
92. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1938) ("Any party may serve Upon any adverse party 
' ' 
written interrogatories to be answered by the party served, or if the party served 
is a public or private corporation or a pa,rtnership or association, by any officer 
thereof ,competent to testify in its behalf.'~) 
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (1938) ("At any time after the pleadings are closed, a 
party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission by the 
latter of the genuineness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited 
with the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth therein.") 
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Entry upon Land) did not.94 It seems fair to conclude, however, 
that from their inception, the service/filing and dis-covery rules 
mandated th.at information gathered during the pretrial period 
be filed in court absent affirmative action by a court. Once 
filed in court, this information was presumptively open to ex-
amination by anyone unless a Rule 26 protective order was ob-
tained. Discussion of the case law under Rule 5 until 1970, 
when it was amended, is in Section V.A. 
Because of the multiplicity of bodies dealing with changes 
to the FRCP, a brief road map of the amendment process may 
be helpful. In accordance with the Rules Enabling Act of 
1934,95 amendments to federal rules go through a hierarchical 
path in the U.nited States Judicial Conference. Amendments 
are drafted by the relevant advisory committee, later consid-
ered by the Standing Committee on Rules and Practice, and 
then submitted to the Judicial Conference.96 If the Judicial 
Conference approves, the amendments are considered by the 
United States Supreme Court.97 The Court may reject or mod-
ify proposed revisions and promulgates them prior to May 
lst.98 The High Court then submits the amendment to Con-
gress, which has until December 1st to modify or reject the 
proposed change.99 If Congress fails to act, the amendment is 
final. 
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 (1938). 
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice 
to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may (1) order-
any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photo-
graphing, by or on beh-alf of the moving party, of any designated docu-
ments, papers, books . . or (2) order any party to permit entry upon des· 
ignated land or other property in his possession or control for the 
purpose of inspecting, measuring .... 
95. Presently codified at 28 U.S.C~ §§ 2072-74 (2003). 
96. The advisory committee is_ appointed by the Chief Justice of the United 
States. See U.S. Courts website, http://www. uscourts.govlreview .htm (last visited 
-.May 19, 2006) (he:reinafter "U.S. Courts website"). The Standing Committee is 
appointed in the same way as the advisory committee, i.e., in the sole discretion of 
the Chief Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2073. The Judicial Conference is composed of the 
Chief Justice, the Chief Judges of the U ~S. Courts of Appeals, and a district judge 
from each circuit. See id. 
97. See U.S. Courts w_ebsite~ supra note 95. 
98. ld. 
99. Id. 
• 
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B. The 1970 Amendment to Rule 5( a) 
The 1970 revision of Rule 5 began with a proposal in 1967 
by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. Although there was 
an initial discussion of an amendment to Rule 5 at the Advisory 
Committee meeting, the members decided not to vote on a pro-
posal without public comment.lOO In November 1967, the Advi: 
sory Committee published a Preliminary Draft of Proposed 
Amendments.IOI The proposed addition to Rule 5 is in bold: 
Rule 5. Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers. 
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in 
these rtd~J', every order required by its terms to be served, 
every pleading subsequent to the original complaint unless 
the court otherwise orders because of the numerous defen-
dants, eve:ry paper ·relating to discovery required to 
be served upon a party unless the cqurt otherwise 
orders, every written motion other than one which may be 
heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, de-
mand, offer of judgment, designation of record on appeal, 
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. 
• • • 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be 
. . . 
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either be-
fore service or within a reasonable time thereafter. 
100. MINUTES OF THE MARCH 1967 MEETING OF THE ADVISORY COMMITIEE ON 
CML RULES 4Q-41 (1967). Unfortunately, the minutes do not provide the actual 
change that the committee discussed. Id. -Judge Thomsen~ a committee member, 
argued that it was "a mistake to change Rules just offhand because some think it's 
a good idea, without the reporter having looked for the snakes .... I don't think 
we ought to publish changes of Rules which are just brought at a .meeting here, 
when nobody has had a change to think about them." Id. Another committee 
member stated that he would vote against a change to the Rule, and the commit-
tee ended up not making any changes to Rule 5 at that time. I d. 
101. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedures 
for the United States District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery, 43 
F.R.D. 211 (1967). The Preliminary Draft was published by both the Standing 
Committee and the Advisory Committee. !d. at 213. The draft noted that the 
proposed amendments were a result of consideration by the Advisory Committee . 
Id. The proposals were. also a result of a field study of the operation of the exist-
ing discovery rules conducted by the Columbia University Project for Effective 
Justice. !d. at 217. The advisory committee noted that all parties must be served 
with all papers relating to discovery to inform all parties of the progress of litiga • 
tion. Id. 
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(e) Filing With the Court Defined. The filing of pleadings 
and other papers with the court as required by these rules 
shall be made ·by filing them with the clerk of the 
t 102 cour .... 
837 
The proposal made explicit what had been implicit, i.e.,, that all 
discovery was to be served on each party and, pursuant to Rule 
5(d), filed with the. court. The Standing Committee met from 
:July 17~19, 1969, to discuss the change to Rule 5(a) and rati-
fied the propo'sa1. 103 The Supreme Court approved the 
amendment and submitted it to Congress .. I04 Because Con .. 
gress took no action, 105 Rule 5 now explicitly required court fil-
ing of all discovery material. 
Rule 5(a) and the discovery rules were changed to require 
that service of all discovery papers be made on all parties re-
gardless of which party produced the information, unless the 
district court ordered otherwise., 106 Exceptions could be made 
by the district ,court if discovery was voluminous or there were 
many parties.I07 A court's power to excuse filing was codified 
in the 1980 amendments to Rule 5(d))08 With regard to acce.ss 
to discovery, the Advisory Committee note to the 1970 amend-
ment recognized that problems might be created for district 
courts when discovery papers become voluminous.l09 
102. REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO 
DEPOSITION AN DISCOVERY (Nov. 1, 1968). ''We propose no change in this Rule as 
drafted by the Advisory Committee." I d. at 2, 4. 
103. MINUTES OF THE JULY 17-19; 1969 MEETING OF THE STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2 (1969). The Committee 
noted that there were comments from lawyers complaining that certain parties in 
multi .. party disputes would be excluded from some discovery exchanges. The Oc-
tober,. 1969 Report by the· Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
was published in 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970). Report of the Standing Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Judicial Conference, Oct., 1969. 
104. 48 F.R.D. 487, 491 (1970). Justices Black and Douglas dissented from the 
amendments and from the Court's action in sending them to Congress. ld. at 459. 
There was no. explanation of why these Justices dissented. See id. 
105. 48 F.R.D. 459, 491-92 (1970). 
106. The explicit purpos.e of this amendment was to respond to complaints that 
parties in a multiple party suit did not receive certain discovery materials because 
the materials did not pertain directly to them. FED. R. Crv. R. 5(a) advisory com-
mittee's note (1970). 
107. 48 F.R.D. 487 at 492. 
108. See infra Part N.C; see also 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980). 
109-. Id. 
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Moreover, taken as a whole, it was clear the FRCP re-
quired discovery to be filed. The introductory language of Rule 
5(a), "except as otherwise provided in these rules," recognized 
that other parts of the FRCP may provide for different service 
provisions. Several other rules, e.g., Rule 45(c) subpoenas and 
Rule 77(d) entry of orders in judgments, did indeed specify ser-
vice in a different fashion. Section V.B. will discuss the case 
law relating to access to discovery between 1970 and 1980. 
C. The 1980 Amendment to Rule 5( d) 
1. The Initial1978 Proposal 
As we have seen, filing of all discovery was historically re-
quired by the FRCP and explicitly required by the 1970 
Amendment to Rule 5. In June of 1977, the Federal Judicial 
Center published a Survey of Local Civil Discovery Procedures, 
highlighting perceived problems regarding discovery.IIO Later 
that year, a report by the Special Committee for the Study of 
Discovery Abuse of the ABA's Litigation Section supported a 
FRCP amendment that would eliminate the required filing of 
depositions because of cost and storage concerns. til The Com-
mittee specifically did not support non-filing of other discovery 
material interrogatories, requests for admissions, and re-
quests for production. liZ "Generally, the cost of filing copies of, 
and requisite storage for, these types of papers should not be 
burdensome."ll3 In fact, the Committee noted that it is benefi-
cial for courts to have these documents in order to prepare for 
pretrial conferences and for other purposes.114 
110. The survey focused on consumption of judicial resources, attorneys' lack of 
diligence in expediting litigation and the "abuse" of the pre-trial process. Thad M. 
Guyer, Survey of Local Civil Discovery Procedures (Federal Judicial Center 1977). 
Ill. Report of the American Bar Association Special Committee for the Study of 
Discovery Abuse, Section of Litigation (1977) A.B.A. LIT. REP. microformed on CI-
7701-35 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). "The committee recognizes 
that the cost of providing additional copies of transcripts of oral depositions can be 
considerable and that storage problems may exist with respect thereto. This 
committee therefore, endorses the amendment to the extent that it would dis-
pense with the necessity of filing depositions upon oral examination.'' I d. 
112. Id. "The committee believes, however, that interrogatories, requests for 
admissions, answers to each, and requests for production should continue to be 
filed with the court." ld. 
113.. ld. 
114. Id. "Additionally, the court would be assisted by having these discovery 
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The ruletnaking process applicable to the 1980 amend-
ments to the civil rules required the Advisory Committee to cir-
culate drafts of proposed amendments to bench and bar and to 
schedule and conduct public hearings if appropriate. In March 
of 1978, a proposed change to Rule 5{d) was published in the 
Federal Rules Decision) IS Additions to the existing Rule 5 are 
bolded: 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be 
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either be-
fore service or within a reasonable time thereafter[.], but, 
unless filing is ordered by the court on motion of a 
party or upon its own motion, depositions upon oral 
examination and interrogatories and requests for 
admission and the answers thereto need rtot be filed 
unless and until they are used in the proceedings.l16 
The proposal would have fundamentally altered practice under 
Rule 5 by forbidding filing-of discovery materials except those 
ordered to be filed by the district court or "used in the proceed-
ing."ll7 The Judicial Conference Civil Rules Committee circu-
lated the proposal, together with other suggested, far more con-
troversial discovery amendments, for public comment, 118 and 
there were many responses.ll9 
The amendment reflected the views of a number of district 
court judges and court clerks regarding the burden presented 
papers accessible to it so that the court _could more fully prepare for pretrial con· 
ferences and other hearings relating to the action." ld. 
115. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Pro~ 
cedure, 77 F.R.D. 613, 622 (1978). 
116. ld. 
117. ld. 
118. WINIFRED R. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND 
POSSIBILITIES 17 (Federal Judicial Center 1981). 
119. Id. at 18, n.40. 
Comments were received from various bar associations, practicing law-
yers, the Department of Justice, clerks of court, the National Shorthand 
Reporters Association, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 
the Ge.neral Counsel of the NAACP Special Contribution ·Fund, the Insti-
tute for Public Representation (Georgetown University Law -Center), the 
American Civil Liberties Union, various associations of newspaper pub· 
lishers and editors, Legal Aid and Services Associations, the Migrant Le-
gal Action Program, and the Public Citizen Litigation Group. 
Jd. at 18. There was originally only a ninety day public comment period. Due to 
requests fo:r; extension, the final date for comment was November 30 rather than 
July 1 of 1978. 
• 
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by the requirement to file all discovery and to serve it on all 
counseJ.l20 Some district courts had adopted local rules limit-
ing the filing of interrogatories and other discovery devices.I21 
The proposal generated sharp debate and controversy from 
members of the legal community and the press. Public hear· 
ings were held for two days in Washington and Los Angeles in 
October and November 1978, where twenty-five representa-
tives expressed their views.122 There is no public record of 
these oral comments.I23 However, there is a record of the writ-
ten comments. The Standing Committee received nineteen 
written responses, nine in favor and ten in opposition to the 
proposed amendments.124 
120. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, at 1152, n.3. 
121. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, at 1152, n.4. 
122. Letter from Walter Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules to Judge Thomsen, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure (June 14, 1979), microformed on CI-8201 (Records of the U.S. Ju-
dicial Conference). 
123. The Federal Judicial Center report did not contain specific sources regard-
ing the hearings. Brown, supra note 118, at 19-20, n.42. However, this report did 
note the witnesses present at each hearing: 
Witnesses at the Washington hearings were: representatives of the 
American Bar Association; the National Shorthand Reporters Asso-
ciation; the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund; the Na-
tional Council of the United States Magistrates; a New York admi-
ralty law firm; the bar associations of the cities of New York and of 
Philadelphia; Special Counsel to the National Commission for Re-
view of Antitrust Laws and Procedures; two clerks of court; a patent 
attorney; and a private practitioner specializing in complex litiga-
tion. Witnesses in Los Angeles were: representatives of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and of the Los Angeles County Bar Association; 
the chairman of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference Ad Hoc 
Committee on Discovery; two private practitioners; and the two di-· 
rectors of an Arizona State University study of discovery. 
I d. Also, microfiche materials from the Notre Dame library did not contain a pub· 
lie record of the· hearings. All information pertaining to the public hearings was 
taken from the Federal Judicial Center Report. All microfiche materials were ob-
tained form the Notre Dame Library using the indexes provided by the Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts. 
124. Many of the letters simply agreed with the proposed changes. See, e.g., 
Letters from Eugene Gordon and Carmon Stuart to Judge Thompsen, Chairman 
of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Oct. 6, 1978), mi-
croformed on CI- 7606 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from the 
American College of Trial Lawyers (Aug. 16, 1978), microformed on CI-7607 (Re-
cords of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Committee on Federal Courts of the New 
York State Bar Association report to Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., Secretary of the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 29, 1978), microformed on 
CI-7603 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). Others agreed with the pro-
posed changes and recommended additional changes of their own. See, e.g., Letter 
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A number of the negative comments were quite detailed. 
The American Newspaper Publishers Association, for example, 
emphasized the public's right of access to information concern-
ing the government and the judicial system. The Publisher's 
Association opposed the proposed change to Rule 5(d) because 
members of the press who cover court proceedings regularly 
check discovery materials for information.l25 This submission 
quoted the Supreme Court in Cox Broadcasting Co. v~ Cohn, l26 
describing the public's reliance on the press to provide vital in-
formation, and concluded the "[First] Amendment rests on the 
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of informa-
tion from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the 
welfare of the public, that a free press is a condition of a free 
society.'' l27 
from Robert Jenkins, Professor at Campbell College School of Law (Nov. 10, 
1978), microformed on CI-7603 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (agree-
ing with the proposal and suggesting adding that Rule 34 materials should also 
not be filed); Comments by the Discovery Abuse Committee of the_ National Con-
ference of Special Court Judges (June 10, 1978), microformed on CI-7513-94 (Re-
cords of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (supporting the drafted change to Rule 5, 
but asking that responses to requests for admissions be exempted from the non-
filing proposal); Letter from the Community Legal Aid Society to the Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 19, 1978), microformed on CI-7607 (Re· 
cord of the U.S. Judjcial Conference) (making minor suggestion to the proposal 
about whether a court has discretion to deny a party's motion). 
The letters in opposition to the proposed changes cited various reasons for 
their disapproval. See, e.g., Letter from Allen Barrow, Chief Judge of the North-
ern District of Oklahoma, to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
(June 15, 1978), microformed on Cl-7607 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence) (arguing that the proposed amendment would cause increased paperwork 
due to requests for requiring filing; arguing that the amendment would also delay 
the trial process); Letter from Ann Broadwell of the Legal Aid Society of San 
Mateo County, California, to Roszel C. Thomsen, Chairperson of the Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 24, 1978), microformed on CI-7609 (Re-
cords of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (stating that the proposed rule makes it dif-
ficult for a party to use discovery other than the discovery that party has engaged 
in, which makes multi-party litigation difficult); Letter from Walter Schaefer to 
.. . 
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 11, 1978), microformed 
on CI-7607 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (stating that the proposal is 
confusing because it was unclear whether filing would be prohibited or simply not 
required); Letter from Richard Schmidt; American Society of Newspaper Editors, 
to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 30, 1978), microformed 
on CI-7712 (Records of the U.B. Judicial Conference) (opposing the proposal due 
to the public use of discovery filings). 
125. Letter from Richard Schmidt, American Society of Newspaper Editors, to 
the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Nov. 30, 1978). 
126. 420 u.s. 469, 491-92 (1975). 
127. Associated Press v ., United States, 326 U.S.l; 20 (1945). 
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The ACLU vigorously opposed the 1978 proposal, stressing 
the common law right of public access to judicial records 128 and 
the constitutional protection of access to discovery materials. 129 
Perceived storage problems could not justify an abridgement of 
these rights. 130 
[I]n our present society[,] many important social issues be-
come entangled to some degree in civil litigation. Indeed 
certain civil suits may be instigated for the very purpose of 
gaining information for the public. . . . Civil litigation in 
general often exposes the need for governmental action or 
correction. Such revelations should not be kept from the 
public. 131 
Finally, the ACLU pointed out that adoption of the proposal 
violated public policy. The critical problem with the proposed 
change was that it "suggest[ed] that private litigation simply is 
none of the general public's business, and that information col-
lected, in anticipation of court proceedings is not 'public' infor-
mation at all, unless and until it is actually used in those pro-
ceedings."l32 The federal rules already provided sufficient 
protection for parties' privacy interest through protective or-
ders available upon a showing of good cause. The ACLU thus 
argued that the proposed change would shift the burden re-
garding access to discovery materials from the parties to the 
public, contrary to federal statutory provisions which support 
the public's access to information.133 
128. Letter from ACLU to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 2-6 (Dec. 5, 
1978), microformed on CI-7601 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). 
129. ld. at 7-15. See Trial Secrecy and the First Amendment Right of Public 
Access to Judicial Proceeding, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1899 (1978). 
130. ACLU letter, supra note 128, at 7 (citing cases favoring the public right of 
access including Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Chicago 
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
131. ACLU letter, supra note 128 (citing Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 
F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1958)) (stating that taking a deposition ''shall be open to the 
public as freely as are trials in open court; and no order excluding the public from 
attendance on any such proceedings shall be valid or enforceable."); Alliance to 
End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
132. ACLU letter, supra note 128. The First Amendment protects the free flow 
of information, and the ACLU asserted that discovery materials must be included 
in protected information. ld. 
133.. Id. (citing Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2004); Government in the Sun-
shine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2004); Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2004)). . 
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2. The- Revised 1979 Propos-al 
The negative public response to the initial 1978 proposal 
persuaded the Advisory Committee to submit a revised draft 
amendment in February 1979~ The new proposal follows_. The 
material in bold indicates additions to, and the italicized mate-
rial indicates deletions from, the original 1978 proposed 
amendment to Rule 5. 
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be 
served upon a party shall be filed with the court either be-
fore service or within a reasonable time thereafter[.],but~ 
unless filing is ordered by the court on motion of a party or 
upon its own motion, depositions upon oral examination and 
interrogatories and requests· for admission and the answers 
thereto need not be filed unless and until they are used in the 
proceedings. 
but the court may on a motion of a party or on its 
own initiative order that depositions upon oral ex-
amination and interrogatories, requests for docu-
ments, requests for admission, and answers and re-
sponses thereto not be filed unless on order of the 
court for use in the proceeding.l34 
The critical difference, of course, is that the 1978 proposal pro-
hibited filing of discovery absent judicial order, while the 197-9 
proposal retained required filing of discovery absent a co-urt or-
der. 
Judge Walter Mansfield, Chair of the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules, credited the change in the proposal to amend 
Rule 5(d) to adverse comments following its original publica-
tion., He noted three reasons for jettisoning the 1978 changes. 
First, the original proposal would create difficulty for multi-
party litigants who do not attend all depositions to obtain the 
recorded deposition-. Second, the proposal would create an "un-
-
conscionable burden" requiring a court order for access to dis-
. 
covery materials. Third, public interest lawyers had argued 
that the initial 1978 proposal would be likely to increase, not to 
decrease, costs.I35 
134. 85 F.R.D. 521; 525 (1980). 
135. Letter from Walter R. Mansfield to Judge Roszel Thomsen, Chairman of 
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 14, 1979) (sum-
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Proponents of the original 1978 proposal then initiated an 
org,anized campaign to reverse this decision~ Carmon J. Stuart, 
a clerk in the Middle District of North Carolina, wrote a letter 
to other clerks on February 20, 1979, encouraging them to ask 
their judges to write in opposition to the 1979 revised draft.I36 
Ninetee.n judges, three clerks, and the New York County Law-
yers' Association wrote to the Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure in opposition to the 1979 revised draft of the 
amendment to Rule 5(d).I37 All but one were submitted within 
just three weeks after Mr. Stuart's letter~ 
mary of reasons for change in the final draft of the amendment). 
136. Letter from Carmon J. Stuart to Clerks of the U.S. District Courts (Feb. 
20, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-90 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) 
(explaining the changed proposal and encouraging other clerks to oppose there· 
vised draft): 
Talk to your chief judge; show him this material if you like; and urge him 
to write a letter, supporting this amendment. . . . If your chief judge is 
not available, any judge will do. Two judges are better than one. Draft a 
letter for him and take it with you when you present this idea to him. 
You know better than he does how much the unnecessary filing of this 
material costs the courts in terms of space and personnel time {or, if you 
are not receiving it~ how much it will cost you if you are ever required to 
receive it). 
ld. Mr. Stuart included a letter from Judge Gordon of his own court soliciting 
other judges to respond. The responses by the chief judges basically followed the 
scheme-that Mr. Stuart and Judge Gordon requested. See id. 
137. Letter f:rom Anthony Alaimo, Chief Judge, Southern District of Georgia 
(1\'Iar. 5, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-39 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence); Letter from Charles Banta, Clerk, Middle District of Louisiana (Mar. 5, 
1979), microformed on CI-7805-51 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Let-
ter from James Battin, Chief Judge, District of Montana (Mar. 9, 1979), micro-
forrned on CI-7805-12 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from 
Howard Bratton, Chief Judge, District of New Mexico (Mar. 12, 1979), micro-
formed on CI-7804-91 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Wal· 
ter Craig, Chief Judge, District of Arizona (Mar. 2, 1979), microformed on CI-
7805-73 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from John Curtin, Dis-
trict Judge, Western District of New York (Mar. 7, 1979), microformed on Cl-
7805 41 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Edward Devitt, 
Chief Judge, District of Minnesota (Mar. 23, 1979), microformed on CI-7804-85 
(Records of the U.S~ Judicial Conference); Letter fro1n Franklin Dupree, Judge, 
Eastern District of North Carolina (Mar. 8, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-28 
(Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Clarkson Fisher, Judge, 
District of New Jersey (Mar. 13, 1979), microformed on CI-7804-89 (Records of 
the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Edward Gignoux, District Judge, Dis-
trict of Maine (Mar. 5, 1979), microformed on Cl-7805 44 (Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference); Letter from Eugene Gordon, Chief Judge, Middle District of 
North Carolina (Feb. 20, 1979), microformed on Cl-7806-53 (Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference); Letter from James Greilsheim-er, New York County Law-
yers' Association (Feb. 28, 1979), microformed on CI-7805 (Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference) (objecting to the initial proposal due to public interest in ac-
'2007] DISCOVERING DISCOVERY 845 
Despite this campaign, the Advisory Committee supported 
the revised 1979 draft, rather· than the original amendment to 
Rule 5(d).. Of significance to later developments, the Commit-
tee took explicit note of public access, explaining that Hsuch 
[discovery] materials are sometimes of interest to those who 
may have no access to them except by requirement of filing, 
. . 
such as members of a class, litigants similarly situated, or the 
public generally."138 In the end, the amendment continued the 
mandatory filing requirement, but it permitted a court order 
prohibiting filing of discovery materials. 
The Supreme Court approved the 1979 amendment to Rule 
5(d) and submitted it to Congress in August of 1980.139 The 
history of the proposal in Congress demonstrates the support 
for public access to discovery information and the fear that 
even the revised amendm.ent might jeopardize that right. A 
letter to Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the United 
States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, from Charles Bai .. 
ley~ Editor of the Minne-apolis Tribune, June 23, 1980, ex-
pressed the concern that even the revised proposal would cre-
ate the same problems regarding public access as the initial 
1978 proposal.l40 Similarly, ,a New York Times editorial, July 
cess to discovery materials); Letter from Robert Kauffman, Clerk, Southern Dis-
trict of illinois (Mar. 12, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-03 (Records of the U.S. 
Judicial Conference); Letter from Samuel King, Chief Judge, District of Hawaii 
(Mar~ 6, 1979), microformed on Cl-7805-26 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence); Letter from Robert Maxwell, Chief Judge, Northern District of West Vir-
ginia (Feb. 22, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-83 (Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference); Letter from James A. McWhorter, Clerk, Southern District of West 
Virginia (Mar. 8, 1979), micro{ormed on CI-780~16 (Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference); Letter from Marshall Neill, Chief Judge, Eastern District of Wash-
ington (Mar~ H, 1979), microformed on CI-7805-14 (Records of the U.,S. Judicial 
Conference); Letter from David Porter, Judge, Southern District of Ohio (Aug. 1, 
1979), microformed on Cl-7610-91 (Records of the· U.S. Judicial Conference); Let-
ter from Otto Skopil, Chief Judge, District of Oregon (Mar. 12, 1979), microformed 
on CI-7804-93 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Albert 
Stephens, Chief Judge, Central District of California (l\1ar. 9, 1979); microformed 
on CI-7805-01 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Warren Ur-
bom, Chief Judge, District of Nebraska (Mar. 5, 1979), microformed on CI-7805 
(Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from James Von der Heydt, Chief 
Judge, District of Alaska (Mar. 1, 1979), microformed on CI_:7805-57 (Records of 
the U.S. Judicial Conference); Letter from Laughlin Waters, District Judge, Cen· 
tral District of California (Mar. 7, 1979), microformed on Cl-7805-30 (Records of 
the U~S. Judicial Conference). 
138. · 85 F.R.D. 521, 525 (1980). The Advisory Committee note recognized that 
although discovery materials must be· filed, they are often unused. 
139. ld. at 521. 
140. Letter from Charles Bailey, Editor of the Minneapolis Tribune, to Edward 
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22, 1980, criticized even the revised amendment's ability to 
prevent public access to discovery materials.14 1 Robert Drinan, 
Chair of the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, made 
explicit his understanding that the proposed change would not 
e.ncourage waiver of filing :and that a limit on filing would occur 
only when the balance between private and public interests fa-
vored the private interests.I42 Gerald Hegel, President of the 
Association of Records Managers and Administrators, Inc., 
wrote to Chief Justice Warren Burger suggesting the use of low 
cost records centers to deal with the purported administrative 
burden of discovery materials.l43 Joseph Spanio, Deputy Di-
rector of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts responded 
"[T]he general rule that all such documents are required to be 
filed remains in effect. All documents must be filed unless the 
court directs otherwise."l44 Finally, Senator Kennedy warned: 
It is the expectation of the Senate Judiciary Committee that 
relief sought under amended Rule 5(d) will be authorized on 
a case-by-case basis and only in circumstances when the 
court has explicitly determined that it is unlikely that the 
proceeding will be of interest to the general public, members 
of a class, or litigants similarly situated, and when the court 
has determined that the pretrial materials in a particular 
proceeding are very voluminous.l45 
Others in Congress expressed similar concerns.I46 
l{ennedy, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
(June 23, 1980)~ microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U~S. Judicial Confer-
ence). 
141. Paper Justice, N.Y. TIMES, -July 22, 1980, at AlB. 
142. Letter from Robert Drinan; Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, to Joseph Spaniol, Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts (June 24, 1980), microformed on CI-8207-87 (Records of the 
U.S. Judicial Conference). 
143-. Letter from Gerald Hegel, President, Record Manager & Administrators, 
. . 
to Chief Justice Warren Burger (July 187 1980), microformed on CI-8207--91 (Re-
cords of the U.S. Judicial Con£erence). 
144. Letter from Joseph Spanio to Gerald Hegel (July 31, 1980), microformed 
on CI8207 -87 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference). 
145. Letter from Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, to William Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts (July 29, 1980), microformed on CI-8207-85 (Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference). 
146. See, e.g., Letter from Dennis DeConcini to William Foley (July 25_, 1980), 
microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) ("Other mem-
bers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary have expressed their concern to me 
• 
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In response, William Foley, the Director of the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts, wrote to Senator Kennedy: 
• 
The rule does contemplate that relief from the requirement 
of filing unnecessary discovery materials will be authorized 
on a case-by-case basis and then only when the court has 
determined that it is unlikely that the proceeding will be of 
interest to the general public, members of a class, or liti-
gants similarly situated. . . . The Advisory Committee Note 
states that the discovery "materials are sometimes of inter-
est to those who may have no access to them except by are-
quirement of filing .... " The district courts are thus ad-
vised to take these interests into consideration and to 
process rule 5(d) motions in accordance with normal mo-
tions practice. 147 
Judge Mansfield defended the revised draft148 noting that 
the amendment would not dispense with the discovery filing 
requirement. Rather, filing would be required unless the court, 
on its own motion or on a motion of one of the parties, decided 
that the public interest would not be served by filing of discov-
ery materials. Judge Mansfield further stated that it was ex-
pected that: 
over the application of Rule 5(d) and it will be my intention as Chairman of the 
Improvements in Judiciary Machinery Subcommittee to monitor the application of 
the Rule, and to possibly solicit your assistance in that endeavor."). 
147. Letter from William Foley, Director of the Administrative Office of the 
United States Courts, to Edward Kennedy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee (Aug. 26. 1980), microformed on CI-8207-82 (Records of the U.S. Ju-
dicial Conference). See also Letter from Sherman Cohn, Professor of Law, 
Georgetown University Law Center, to the Editor of the New York Times, (July 
25, 1980), microformed on CI-7713 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (also 
criticizing the article's comments on the limitation of public access); Letter from 
Judge Mansfield to members of the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules 
(July 31, 1980), microformed on Cl- 8210·62 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Confer-
ence) (providing a copy of Paper Justice); Letter to the Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules from Joseph 
Spaniol (Aug. 26, 1980), microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U.S. Judicial 
Conference) (providing information pertaining to the amended Rule 5(d)); Letter 
to all federal judges, U.S. magistrates, circuit executives, and clerks of court from 
Joseph Spaniol (Aug. 26, 1980), microformed on CI-7712 (Records of the U.S. Ju-
dicial Conference) (providing copies of correspondence regarding the amended 
Rule 5(d)). 
148. Letter from Judge Mansfield to Max Frankel, Editor of the New York 
Times (July 23, 1980), microformed on CI-8210-62 (Records of the U.S·. Judicial 
Conference) (criticizing the article Paper Justice by explaining the intended appli-
cation of the Rule). 
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[A] judge would not be expected to excuse parties from filing 
materials in any case in which the public or the press had 
an interest, such as a Watergate or similar scandal. More-
over, should the public importance of the material not ap-
pear until after filing has been excused, it is expected that 
the judge, upon motion of the press or other interested per-
sons, would order the parties to file the documents for in-
spection.149 
In an attempt to study the application of the new Rule 5(d), the 
district courts were directed by the Administrative Office to 
submit information about the application of Rule 5(d) in prac-
tice.150 
D. The 2000 Amendment to Rule 5 
As we have seen, prior to 2000, Rule 5(d) required discov-
ery materials to be promptly flled with the court.l51 One clear 
reason for that requirement was to guarantee public access to 
information discovered pretrial. The costs incurred by this pro-
cedural rule were explicitly acknowledged. Many· districts, 
however, had adopted local rules or orders barring parties from 
filing discovery.I52 The next change to Rule 5 did away with 
public access. 
• 149. Id. The following additional correspondence pertained to the amendment 
submitted to Congress: Report to the House Committee on the Judiciary from the 
American Law Division (June 30, 1980), microformed on CI-7713-7714 (Records 
of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (providing a survey of the local rules regarding 
discovery materials); Letter from Philip Pratt, U.S. District Judge, to Judge 
Mansfield (July 9, 1982), microformed on Cl-8207- 81 (Records of the U.S. Judi-
cial Conference) (stating that local rules prohibiting discovery would subvert the 
intent of the amended 5(d)). 
150. Letter from James McCafferty to the clerks of the U.S. District Courts 
(Apr. 17, 1981), microformed on CI-7714 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) 
(requesting more information on the application of the amended 5(d), and includ-
ing a table on district court orders pertaining to Rule 5(d)); Letter from Joseph 
Spaniol to all clerks of the U.S. District Courts (Oct. 20, 1980), microformed on 
Cl-7714 (Records of the U.S. Judicial Conference) (requesting information to 
evaluate the impact of the amended Rule 5(d)). The responses showed there were 
a total of only forty-five orders entered dispensing the filing requirement in the 
following districts between November, 1980 and February, 1981: the Central Dis-
trict of Illinois, the District of Kansas, the Western District of Kentucky, the Dis-
trict of Maine, the District of New Jersey, the District of New Mexico, the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, the District of Puerto Rico, and the Middle District of 
Tennessee. 
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d), advisory committee's note, 1980. 
152. Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confiden-
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In 1996·, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee, 
which monitors the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, began a 
re-examination of the discovery rules. Concerns. about the 
costs and usefulness of pretrial investigation prompted this re-
examination. I 53 The Advisory Committee sought to "focus on 
the architecture of discovery rules and determine whether 
modest changes could be effected to reduce costs of discovery, to 
increase its efficiency, to restore uniformity of practice, and to 
encourage the judiciary to participate more actively in case 
management."I54 A Discovery Subcommittee was appointed to 
explore possible revisions to the rules.t55 The Subcommittee 
' 
collected and compiled information regarding the pretrial proc-
ess and commissioned two major studies to gather empirical 
data from practicing attorneys about discovery.156 A conference 
was also held at the Boston College Law School in September of 
1997.157 Mter evaluating the results of the studies and receiv-
ing responses from academics, the bar, and interested institu-
tions, the Discovery Subcommittee re.commended that the Ad-
visory Committee propose amendments to the rules of 
discovery.l58 
In March of 1998, the Advisory Committee met and rec-
ommended a change in Rule 5(d) as. part of an overall discovery 
. 
tiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 325, n.170 (1999); 
Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 
9 J.L. & POL'Y 67, 80 (2000); See, e.g., N.D. & S.D. Iowa L.R. 15(a) (requiring that 
discovery materials not be filed). 'lThere [we]re indications that even in districts 
that d[id] not have local rules barring filing, nonfiling [wa]s a routine habit with 
many attorneys." 181 F.R.D. 18, 38 (Feb. 1999)~ 
153. Whether there is "abuse of discovery'' and what constitutes "abuse" is 
fiercely contested, but these topics are beyond the scope of this article. See, e~g., 
. 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Ruleniaking: Errors of 
Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001). 
154. Memor~ndum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules to the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999) http://www. uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV 
05-1999.pd£ (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
155. Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22 
CARDOZO L. REV. 75, 77 (2000). 
156. 181 F.R.D. at 25. The Subcommittee was chaired by Judge David F. Levi 
of the District Court for the Eastern District of California. The studies were con-
ducted by the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC study''), and the RAND Corporation 
Institute for Civil Justice ("Rand study''). 
157. ld. at 35; Transcript of the "Alumni" Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. 
L. REV. 809 (1998). 
158. Tobias, supra note 154, at 78. 
tl 
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"package."159 Rule 5 was the tail on that much larger dog. Ad-
ditions are bolded. 
(d) FILING; CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. All papers after 
the complaint required to be served upon a party, ["shall"] 
must be filed with the court within a reasonable time after 
service, but ... disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l) or (2) 
and the following discovery requests and responses 
· must not be filed until they are used in the proceed-
ing or the court orders filing: (i) depositions, (ii) in-
terrogatories, (iii) requests for documents or to per-
mit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for 
admission. 160 
This was, of course, a revival of the initial 1978 proposal and 
debate. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure, chaired by Judge Paul Niemeyer, heard testimony from 
more than 300 witnesses at three public hearings in Baltimore, 
Chicago and San Francisco and received more than 300 written 
comments submitted by the public. 16 1 Mter considering the 
public comments and making a small number of changes, the 
Standing Committee submitted the package of discovery 
amendments to the Judicial Conference. 
In September of 1999, the Judicial Conference tendered 
these amendments to the Supreme Court which approved the 
package and forwarded it to Congress. Congress took no ac-
tion, thus ratifying the changes.l62 
Mter the 2000 amendments, Rule 5(d) read: 
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a 
party, together with a certificate of service, must be filed 
with the court within a reasonable time after service, but 
disclosures under Rule 26(a)(l) or (2) and the following dis-
covery requests and responses must not be filed until they 
are used in the proceeding or the court orders filing: (i) 
depositions, (ii) interrogatories, (iii) requests for documents 
159. 181 F.R.D. at 39. 
160. MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CML § 5APP.l0 2000 Amendment to Sub-
division (d) (LEXIS 2005). 
161. Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, supra note 153, at 3 "[T]he proc-
ess pursued in connection with the discovery rules package created an unusually 
well-informed Committee that acted most selectively to adopt a modest, balanced 
package to address identified problems in a manner comfortable to the practicing 
bar and to the courts." Id. 
162. Id. 
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or to permit entry upon land, and (iv) requests for admis-
sion.l63 
851 
The pre-2000 Rule required ·discovery materials to be filed 
unless exempted by the court, while the revised Rule prohibits 
discovery materials from being filed unless they are "used in a 
court proceeding," l64 with minor exceptions.165 U n-filed infor-
mation is now managed by the parties' attorneys and is no 
longer assumed to be part of the judicial record. 166 In support-
ing a motion or in other proceedings, parties may refer to, or 
rely upon, only those discovery materials specifically filed.167 
A number of justifications were given for the 2000 amend-
ment: (1) the preexisting inconsistency of local rules and the 
lack of a uniform national standard;l68 and (2) the expense and 
burden of the filing requirement. Previously, many districts 
had local rules limiting or excusing filing of discovery, creating 
disparity among districts.I69 "[T]he collective wisdom reflected 
in so many local rules strongly supports the conclusion that 
routine filing of all discovery materials is inappropriate."170 
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d). 
164. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 5.33(2) (3d ed., 
1997). "Used in the proceeding" is synonymous with "relevant to a court proce· 
dure," ensuring that all relevant material is presented to the court in connection 
with the particular procedure at hand. While this phrase includes most activities 
in connection with a lawsuit, it _most notably does not include depositions. Id. 
While the Committee note declares that a court can order the filing of discovery 
materials, regardless of whether they are used in a court proceeding, this is not 
made explicit in amended Rule 5(d). Rule 5 also supersedes and invalidates all 
the local court rules pertaining to the filing or nonfiling of discovery materials. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note. 
165. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3) (providing no Rule 5 exemption for the disclosure 
and exchange of lists of trial evidence) and Rule 35 Requests for a Physical or 
Mental Examination. Id. 
166. MOORE, supra note 163, at 5.33[3][a]. 
167. ld. 
168. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evi-
dence, 181 F.R.D. 18, 50 (Admin. Off. of the United States Courts, Feb. 1999) (pre-
liminary draft) "There is no apparent reason to have different filing rules in dif-
ferent districts." 181 F.R.D. at 50. At the Boston conference in 1997, former 
Advisory Committee member John Frank stated that "[T]the biggest task of the 
Committee at this moment is to try to achieve uniformity. The variance· not 
merely between states in the one case, but among districts, ... makes us realize 
what was meant to be a fundamental premise of the Rules, names a uniform sys-
tem for the federal courts, simply doesn't exist." 39 B.C. L. REV. at 811. 
169. FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d). 2000 amendment advisory committee note. 
170. 181 F.R.D. at 50. 
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Another motivation, however, behind the 2000 .amendment 
was to reduce the cost and burdens allegedly imposed by the 
filing requirement. The Advisory Committee noted problems 
caused by limited storage space and tedious administrative 
burdens in handling large volumes of paper.t7t The amended 
rule "will require filing of the materials used the most com-
mon illustrations will be uses to support motions, including 
summary judgment motions, or use at trial."172 
Comments submitted by the public generally supported 
changing Rule 5's filing requirement. The American College of 
Trial Lawyers, for example, stated, "[i]t [the filing exemption] 
will not only reduce costs and expenses for the clerk's office, 
but also reduce filing and copy expenses of the parties."l73 The 
Federal Magistrate Judge's Association Rule Committee noted 
"[t]he amendment is a progression of changes that have oc-
-
curred since 1990 with a recognition of the costs imposed on 
parties as well as the court by the required filing of discovery 
materials that are never used in the action."l74 
There was, however, also opposition to .abolishing the filing 
requirement of the pre-2000 Rule, particularly the loss of pub-
lic access to discovery information. The Public Citizen Litiga-
tion Group ("Public Citizen"), a national public interest law 
firm, oppos_ed the amendment because "[f]iling of discovery ma-
terials is particularly important where the suit involves a class 
action, or issues of broad public importance, or allegations of 
official misconduct."175 Similarly, the District of Columbia Bar 
suggested that the Advisory Committee make clear that the 
amendment was "not intended to change the principle in the 
current Federal Rules that discovery materials should be 
available to the public when the public interest in access out-
weighs any countervailing privacy or other interest."l76 Dis-
trict Judge David L. Piester also commented that it was in the 
. . 
171. Paul V~ Niemeyer, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules Memorandum, at 4 
(May 11, 1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV05-1999.pdf [hereinafter 
. . 
Memorandum]. "[F]iling adds burdens and expe.nses not only on the courts but 
also on the parties." 181 F .R.D. at 38 .. 
172. 181 F.,R.D. at 39. 
173. Memorandum, supra note 170, at 4~ 
• 
174. Id. at 7. 
175. Id. at 4. Public Citizen suggested the phrase "must not be filed" be re-
placed with "need not be filed" in order to provide parties with the choice of incur· 
ring costs of filing discovery materials. ]d. 
176. ld. at 4. 
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public interest to allow access to discovery relevant to public 
matters, especially in products liability cases.177 
In the end, the Rule 5(d) filing requirement w,as removed. 
The reasons for this hardly seem compelling and technologic-al 
ch,anges would seem to obviate any real necessity for change. 
In addition, this amendment removed a key argument for pub· 
lie access to discovery material, often affirmed by cases. I turn 
now to how such arguments were treated in the federal case 
law between 1938 and the p,resent. 
N. FEDERAL COURT CASE LAW ON ACCESS TO DISCOVERY 
A. Public Access to Discovery Prior to 1970 
The requirement to publicly file discovery with the court 
was only implicit in the FRCP until 1970, but access to this 
material, and conversely the ability of parties to disclose and 
use it, was widely .Permitted by courts prior to that date.l78 For 
instance, in the widely cited Olympic Refining v. Carter case,I79 
antitrust plaintiffs sought to depose a government attorney 
who was involved in a prior case in which the government had 
brought an antitrust action against the same defendants. 
177. Id .. at 4. Judge Piester suggested that the amendment include a provision 
requiring non-filed documents to be made available by the parties for inspection, 
subject to the power of a court protection order. I d. 
178. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 388 
F.2d 201, 204 (3d Cit. 1967) (reversing-district court's grant of injunction staying 
federal civil antitrust action during pendency of criminal antitrust action based on 
the same events, stating "we know of no rule or equitable principle that protects a 
defendant in a pending criminal prosecution from the_ disclosure, by another per-
son in a separate civil action, of evidence which may later become part of the 
prosecution's case against him."); Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th 
Cir. 1964);- Essex Wire Corp. v. E. Elec. Sales Co., Inc., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 
1969); Brown v. Bullock, 29 F.R.D. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (concluding that plaintiff 
may proceed with production); In re Am. Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Co., 22 
F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Mosher, 248 F.2d 956, 957 (C. C.P.A., 1957) (stat-
ing that it is "clear that at common law, no special interest had to be shown for a 
member of the public to gain access to judicial records.',); Leonia Amusement 
Corp., v. Loew's Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (stating that a party to 
an action "should be able to use [information gained in discovery] in any way 
which the law permits."); Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (con-
cluding that federal court plaintiff may proceed with depositions intended to be 
used in state court action); Desversky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183 
(E.D.N.Y. 1941); but see Beard v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 20 F.R.D. 607 (N.D. Ohio 
1957). See infra note 194 for cases after 1970 with similar holdings. 
179. 332 F.2d 260, 261 (9th Cir. 1964) . 
• 
• 
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Plaintiffs also requested the government attorney produce 
documents from the prior litigation.180 The original case had 
been settled by a consent decree by the time Olympic was pend-
ing, and the discovery material in the earlier case had been 
sealed by stipulation of the parties. 181 The government sought 
to vacate the prior protective orders to permit access for use in 
the pending action.I82 The Ninth Circuit granted the motion, 
stating: 
In the federal judicial system trial and pretrial proceedings 
are ordinarily to be conducted in public .... The purpose of 
the federal discovery rules, as pointed out in Hickman v. 
Taylor, is to force a full disclosure.l83 
The Ninth Circuit further observed that because "all these 
documents had been filed in the district court in the govern-
ment case, Olympic could have examined the filed originals and 
would not have to seek copies from a government official were 
it not for the existence of certain protective orders .... "184 
Discovery access opponents have focused on the term pre-
trial proceedings in this and other cases as limited to discovery 
• 
materials used in judicial action rather than to normal discov-
ery between parties, or what is sometimes referred to as raw 
fruits of discovery. 185 In Olympic, however, no reference is 
made to preliminary hearings or other judicial involvement in 
either case utilizing information gleaned from discovery . 
. 
Rather, the court's discussion of pretrial proceedings simply 
180. Id. at 262 (noting that the requested documents included "answers, 
amended answers, and supplemental answers to defendants' interrogatories and 
all documents and papers related thereto."). 
18L ld. at 261. 
182. Id. 
183. ld. at 264 (internal citations omitted). 
184. Id. at 262. 
185. See United States v. Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 
426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (declining to impose a protective order on information that 
had yet to be submitted with any pre· trial or substantive motions, stating "(u]se of 
the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litigation, 
and even in collaboration among plaintiffs' attorneys, comes squarely within the 
purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); In re Agent Orange Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 565 (E.D.N.Y 1985) (''The second category of docu-
ments represents the raw fruits of discovery. These documents have never been 
filed with the Court."); Id. at 570 ("If access to protected fruits can be granted 
without harm to legitimate secrecy interests, or if no such interests exist, contin-
ued judicial protection cannot be justified." (quoting Nonparty Access to Discovery 
Materials in Federal Courts, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1981))). 
2007] DISCOVERING DISCOVERY 855 
references information gained by parties in FRCP-enforced in-
. . . 
formation gathering. The discovery material sought included 
"answers to ... interrogatories and all documents and papers 
related thereto."l86 This material was available because "all of 
these documents had been filed," 181 
Although an antitrust case, Olympic did not rely on the 
special antitrust disclosure statute that requires depositions in 
.government antitrust litigation to be "ope.n to the public as 
freely as are trials in open court."188 At most, the court saw the 
statute as reflective of pre-existing policies, including those 
embodied in the FRCP. Nor did other courts in this pre-1970 
era limit access to discovery in antitrust matters. For instance, 
Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Electric Sales Co.~ 1 89 was a contract 
dispute in which plaintiffs sought to disregard informal ''se-
crecy provisions" agreed to during the course of a deposition 
and to reveal to third parties various details of the disputed 
contract.l90 Citing Olympic, the court stated: "as a general 
proposition, trial and pre-trial proceedings of the federal judi-
cial s_ystem are ordinarily conducted in public."l91 Numerous 
other cases from this period acknowledge the right to access 
discovery.I92 
During this historical period, judges were often involved in 
the conduct of discovery. ·Many cases permitted discovery de-
spite the fact that a party intended to use the discovery in ei-
ther a parallel state action or a related pro.ceeding in another 
federal court or even in state_ cases.I93 In Sagorsky v. Malyon, 
186. Olympic Ref. Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1964). 
187. Id. (emphasis added). 
188. ld. at 264 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 30 (repealed 2002)). The Olympic court sup-
ported access for third parties by reference to the Federal Rules, the open nature 
of trials, and the Supreme Court's Hickman ruling: "[t]his basic policy has been 
specifically applied in the field of Government antitrust litigation." 
189. 48 F.R.D. 308, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
190. ld. 
191. ld. ''Pre-trial proceedings" are not defined, but here, as in Olympic, there 
is no mention of' any other pretrial hearings or motions involving the court so as to 
distinguish between "pretrial proceedings" and "discovery material." Id. 
192. In re Am. Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Co., 22 F.R.D. 504, 508 (S.D. 
N.Y. 195B) (".[l]t is no objection to the examination that the deposition may be 
used in some other action or proceeding if it is relevant to the pending action."). 
De.seversky v. Republic Aviation Corp, 2 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. N.Y. 1941), decided soon 
after the adoption of the FRCP, provides a similar example in the context of a 
shareholders' derivative action. 
193. See Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Leesona Corp., 27 F.R . D. 440 
(E.D.N~Y. 1961) (approving federal court discovery sought to be used in parallel 
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for example, the court permitted discovery, noting that the 
parallel state court action "does not, in the absence of a show-
ing of bad faith ... deprive a plaintiff of the right to avail itself 
of the deposition-discovery -procedure under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure."194 Another decision notes that "[i]t is set-
tled law that discovery processes are proper even though the 
depositions may be used in some collateral proceeding."195 
These results do not mean that pretrial information was 
always available to third parties or could be used for any pur-
pose. The vast majority of cases were resolved on the basis of 
whether good cause had been shown for a protective order un-
der Rule 26(c). Parties may well have legitimate privacy, busi-
ness or other interests which might justify denying access ~nd 
many cases so held. 196 Courts are routinely engaged in balanc-
ing these interests. An illustrative example from this period is 
Essex v. Wire Corp., 197 which upheld the release of information 
generated during discovery but maintained the protection of 
specific contract terms on the basis of the potential competitive 
disadvantage imposed on the party by their release.198 "[l]f 
this information were disclosed, the moving party would suffer 
great competitive disadvantage and irreparable harm.''199 
patent claim action); Brown v. Bullock, 29 F.R.D. 184 (S.D.N.Y 1961) (federal 
court discovery utilized in state court proceeding under Investment Company Act 
claim); In re Am. Anthracite and Bituminous Coal Co., 22 F.R.D. 504 (S.D.N.Y 
1958); Leona Amusement Corp. v. Loews Inc., 18 F.R.D. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (re-
fusing protective order over defendants objection that discovery was sought for 
use by other attorneys); Sagorsky v. Malyon, 12 F.R.D. 486 (S.D.N.Y 1952) (per-
mitting federal court discovery in insurance claim in state court action); Desever-
sky v. Republic Aviation Corp., 2 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. N.Y. 1941) (permitting use of 
discovery in separate proceeding in stockholders action). 
194. 12 F.R.D. 486, 487 (S.D. NY 1952). There were, to be sure, a few contrary 
decisions. In Union Carbide Corp. v. Filtrol, 278 F. Supp. 553, 559 (D.C. Cal. 
1967), Mobil Oil Corporation, a non-party to a patent action, sought to modify ex-
isting protective orders to gain access to flied information. The court denied Mo-
bil's request, distinguishing other cases because they were antitrust matters. Id. 
at 559. 
195. Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Leesona Corp., 27 F.R.D. 440, 441 
(E.D.N.Y. 1961) (citing American Anthracite and Deseversky supra note 186). 
196. See Carr v. Monroe Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1970); Covey Oil Co. 
v. Cont'l Oil Co., 340 F2d 993 (lOth Cir. 1965); lnt'l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 
F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1963); Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 
(N.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 193 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 
1961). 
197. Essex Wire Corp. v. E . Elect. Sales Co., Inc., 48 F.R.D. 308 (E.D. Pa. 
1969). 
198. Id. at 312. 
199. Id. at 310. 
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B, From 1970-1980 
As discussed earlier,200 Rule 5 was amended in 1970 to 
make explicit that discovery materials must be filed in court. 
The Rule- was next amended in 1980 and the cases between 
1970-80 presented a greater variety of factual circumstances 
than earlier cases. The debate about the use of, and access to, 
discovery became more vigorous, but the case law, with few ex-
ceptions, followed the pre-1970 pattern.20l Some cases specifi-
cally approved disclosure of discovery information for general 
public release.202 In Williams v. Johnson & Johnson,203 for ex· 
ample_, defendant sought to prohibit the plaintiff from rele_asing 
depositions generated in litigation over the contraceptive Ortho 
Novum because the company claimed plaintiffs were "promot-
ing litigation" an_d because the deposition had already been 
used by the author, Barbara Seaman, in the book The Doctor's 
Case Against the Pill.204 The motion for a protective order was 
200. See supra Part III. B. 
201. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v 
Grady, 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978) (treating non-party government request to 
' . 
vacate protective order as a matter of ftrst impression and granting request to 
disclose previously protected discovery); Gen. Dynamics v. Selb Mfg., 481 F.2d 
1204 (8th Cir. 1973) (requiring defendant in civil action to respond to interrogato-
ries despite claim of self incrimination under the 5th amendment); Patterson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980); Parsons v. Gen .. Motors, 85 
F~R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Krause v. Rhodes, 535 F. Supp 33.8 (N.D. Ohio 1979); 
Burgess Const. Co. v. Willamette-Western Corp., 80 F.R.D. 477 (D. Alaska 1978) 
(permitting state of Alaska, as non-party, to access discovery material); Am. Ben. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ille, 87 F.R.D. 540 (D. Okla. 1978); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 
428 F. Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (denying plaintiffs motion for a protective order 
that sought to limit corporate record discovery to the action); Alliance to End ReM 
pression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Johnson Foils Inc . v. Huyck, 
61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (denying defendant's motion for a protective order 
sought on basis of plaintiffs use of discovery in a separate forum); Williams v. 
Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); but see In re Beef Indus. Anti-
trust Litig., 457 F. Supp. 210 (N.D ., Tex. 1978). 
202. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1979). "Generally speaking; 
when a party obtains documents or information through the discovery process, he 
can use that information in any way which the law permits .... [t]he implication is 
clear that without a protective orde.r materials obtained in discovery may be used 
by a party for any purpose, including dissemination to the public." Id. at 188 (in-
ternal quotation omitted). 
203. 50 F.R.D. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
204. Id. at 33. 
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denied.205 The court stated that ''by simple docketing in the 
court, this deposition would become public material."206 
The cases from this period also support the principle that 
filed discovery material ceases to be available only when pro-
tected by a valid protective order. An example is Alliance to 
End Repression v. Rochford,201 which held that some specific 
information regarding Chicago Police surveillance tactics war-
ranted protection from access by non parties but otherwise, "all 
documents filed and proceedings held in federal civil litigation 
are open as a matter of public record."208 Similarly, American 
Telephone and Telegraph v~ Grady209 involved a government 
request, as a third-party, for information generated in discov-
ery in antitrust litigation between AT&T and MCI. The infor-
mation was sealed by stipulated protective order.210 The dis-
trict court granted the government's motion to vacate the 
protective order noting "pretrial discovery must take place in 
the public unless compelling reasons exist for denying public 
access to the proceedings."2ll 
Krause v. Rhodes,212 another well known and widely cited 
case, enunciated similar doctrinal principles. The dispute over 
access to discovery occurred after the original case was set-
tled.213 Citing the ''historic" nature of the Kent State shootings 
underlying the case, plaintiffs intended to turn over pretrial in-
formation to the Yale University library as well as to the Ohio 
Historical Society.214 The discovered material included grand 
205. ld. 
206. ld. The case makes no mention of pretrial proceedings or other motions 
. 
that would undercut the court's equating of "docketing" with the deposition's 
status as "public material." Id. 
207. 75 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1976). 
208. Id. at 433 (emphasis added). 
209. 594 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1978). 
210. I d. at 595. 
211. The importance of the AT&T holding is enhanced by the fact that by this 
time, courts had become more reluctant to treat the government as simply an-
other third-party. See, e.g., Martindell v. Int'l Tel. & Tel., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 
1979) (denying government access to information and noting its "awesome inves-
tigative powers."). 
212. 535 F. Supp. 338 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The case involved the civil suits 
brought by the relatives of individuals killed in the Kent State shootings. 
213. Id. at 342. 
214~ Id. at 343. Material produced by the Ohio Highway Patrol and the Ohio 
National Guard had already been turned over to the Kent State University li-
brary. ld. at 351. The court did state that "Although they are in the constructive 
custody of the court, these discovery materials would only be part of the 'official 
court records open to the public' to the extent they have entered the public do-
• 
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jury testimony, FBI interview reports, testimony of witnesses 
before state grand juries, police radio logs, witness statements, 
photographs and eighty .. three depositions.215 Relying heavily 
on Halkin, the court permitted disclosure of most of this infor .. 
mation, except material that qualified under the protective or-
der standard.2l6 
C. From 1980-2000 
Section III. C. described the history of the 1980 amendment 
to Federal Rule 5(d) .. 217 While the initial proposed rule change 
would have made discovery non-fileable except where a court so 
ordered, vigorous opposition forced a change in the final form of 
' 
the amendment to require filing except when a court ordered it 
otherwise. ln 2000, Rule 5(d) was amended to explicitly forbid 
filing of discovery·. In the interim, many district courts adopted 
local rules which were contrary to the 1980 version of the rule, 
Practice likewise varied. 
A substantial body of federal case law developed during 
these twenty years regarding access to, and use of, discovery 
material. These cases included a United States Supreme Court 
ruling and numerous decisions in the lower courts. Three ma-
jor themes defined the debate: claims of access based upon the 
First Amendment, the common law, and the Federal Rules. 
Courts discussed these themes in a nuanced and careful way, 
often reaching conflicting results. The following sections follow 
these three threads. 
1. First Amendment Right of Access 
In In re Halkin,2IS the D.C. Circuit held that a trial court 
protective order barring dissemination of approximately three 
thousand pages of CIA and NSA information operated as a 
main. Only the latter materials would be subject to the common-law right to in· 
spect and copy, a general right recognized in Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99, 98 S. Ct. 1306, 1311-12, 55 L.Ed.2d 570 (1978)." Id. at 
347. 
215. Id. at 347. 
216. Jd. 
217. See supra notes 109-147 and accompanying text. The public controversy 
over this seemingly technical change reflects the importance attached, at least 
then, to public access to pretrial discovery. 
218. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir~ 1979)~ 
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prior restraint, violating the First Amendment.219 In addition 
to the usual considerations for issuance of a protective order, a 
court "must take account of the important public interests in 
the functioning of the discovery process, and the unique char-
acteristics of that process, as well as the First Amendment in-
terest in unfettered expression."220 The district court's order 
was "seriously infirm," because it had "made no evaluation of 
the First Amendment interests at stake."221 
In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 222 the Supreme Court 
overruled Balkin's First Amendment conclusions. Rhinehart, a 
founder of an unusual religious organization called the Aquar-
ian Foundation,223 filed suit against the Seattle Times based on 
published articles which allegedly subjected him to "public 
scorn, hatred and ridicule."224 In the course of discovery, the 
defendant newspaper sought information from Rhinehart that 
included tax returns and lists of members of, and donors to, the 
Aquarian Foundation.225 Rhinehart resisted disclosure of this 
information and sought a protective order.226 The paper op-
posed the protective order on First Amendment grounds be-
cause it intended to "continue publishing articles about [Rhi-
nehart.]"227 The trial court prohibited publication or 
dissemination of the discovered material under Rule- 26(c) of 
the state rules.228 The Seattle Times appealed.229 
Recognizing the "unique position that such orders occupy 
in relation to the First Amendment,"230 the Supreme Court 
first determined that a protective order does not present "the 
kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First 
Amendment scrutiny."231 Protective orders further a "substan-
tial government interest," namely the court's support and con-
219. Balkin, 598 F.2d at 185 ("A judicial order restraining speech casts the 
judge in a role comparable to that of a censor."). 
220. Id. at 191. 
221. Id. at 196. 
222. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984). 
223. Id. at 22. It held beliefs in life after death and contacting the dead 
through mediums. Rhinehart was the primary medium. Id. 
224. Id. at 23. 
225. Id. at 24. 
226. Id. at 25. 
227. ld. 
228. ld. at 27. 
229. Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, Co., 654 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1982). 
230. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984). 
231. Id. at 33. 
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trol over liberal discovery and the prevention of abuse of the 
discovery proces.s.232 "[W]here, as in this case, a protective or-
der is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and 
does not restrict the dissemination of the information if .gained 
from other sources, it does not offend the First Amendment."233 
As a result, no unconstitutional "prior restraint" is created 
when a trial court specifically evaluates individual private in-
terests and issues a protective order.234 It was thus clear that 
despite public filing of discovery, a court may make an individ-
ual determination to keep discovered material sealed. At the 
same time, the Court recognized that parties also have general 
First Amendment freedoms with regard to information gained 
through discovery and that, "absent a valid court order to the 
contrary, the.y are entitled to disseminate the information .as 
they see fit."235 
2. A Presumptive Common Law Right of Access 
During 1980-2000; the "common law" right of access to 
discovery information was increasingly seen by courts as inde-
pendent of the First Amendment. Courts routinely used a bal-
·ancing test assessment of whether the common law right pro-
vided third-party access, despite various other factors that 
would otherwise have placed the information out of reach.236 
232. ld. at 35. 
233. I d. at 37. The plaintiffs had submitted evidence of threats and harass· 
ment. Id. at 2.6. This was more than sufficient proof to w·arrant protection from 
further dissemination. ld. at 37. Justice Powell, a long;.time opponent of broad 
discovery, wrote that "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public com-
ponents of a civil trial'' and emphasized that trial courts may control discovery as 
well as trial. ld. at 33 & n.19. 
234. Id. at 33. The Court also commented on the impact of the filing require-
ment: 
Jurisdictions that require filing of discovery materials customarily pro~ 
vide that trial courts may order that the materials not be filed .or that 
they be filed under; seal. Federal district courts may adopt local rules 
providing that the fruits of discovery are not to be filed except on order of 
the court. Thus, to the extent that courthouse records could serve as a 
source of public information, access to that source customarily is subject 
to the control of the trial court. 
Id. at n.19 (internal citations omitted). 
235. Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 780 (1st Cit. 1988) (cit-
ing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31-36 (1984)). 
236. Such as protective orders, assertions of attorney-client privilege, and the 
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Often, the dispute arose following the filing and sealing of the 
discovered information. 
For instance, in West Virginia v. Moore,231 the State sought 
"civil recovery for certain alleged corrupt acts" from former 
state governor Arch Moore238. The former governor was de-
posed twice and the case was settled. Mter settlement, a news-
paper and the Associated Press intervened seeking access to 
the. depositions.239 The ·court found that the depositions them-
selves had never been filed, and thus were not judicial docu-
ments subject to a right of access.240 However, regarding the 
excerpts filed under seal with motions, the court granted access 
holding that they could only remain under seal "if countervail-
ing interests heavily outweigh the public's interest in ac-
cess."241 
Similarly, in Hagestad v. Tragesser, the Oregon State Bar 
sought access to sealed records, including a deposition, regard-
ing Hagestad's allegations of sexual abuse against an attorney, 
Tragesser.242 The case had been settled. The State Bar, main-
taining its own disciplinary action, argued that the ''district 
court abused its discretion by sealing its file and, thus, denying 
the State Bar access to the eourt's records."243 The Circuit 
court did not evaluate the matter simply by determining 
whether the sealing order met the good cause standard under 
Rule 26. Instead, the court addressed the strong presumption 
of access that attaches to judicial documents, describing a 
separate balancing approach that begins with a presumption of 
access and weighs the "public interest in understanding the ju-
dicial process'' against "whether disclosure of the material 
could result in improper use of the material."244 Further, "the 
district court must base jts decision on a compelling reason and 
articulate the factual basis for its ruling."245 
work product doctrine. 
237. 902 F. Supp. 715 (S.D. W.Va. 1995). 
238., ld. at 716. 
239. ld. 
240. Id. at 717. 
241. Id. at 718 (quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 
253 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
242. 49 F.3d 1430, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1995)., 
243. ld. at 1434. 
244. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Erection Co.,. Inc., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
245. Id. The circuit court remanded the case, directing the district court to 
make findings in support of sealing the record. ld. at 1435. See also In re Perrigo 
Co., 128 F. 3d 430, 440 (6th Cir. 1997) (denying access to an internal investigative 
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a. Determining What Is a Judicial Document 
During 1980-2000, the common law right increasingly 
came to be characterized as the right to ''judicial documents,'" a 
term subject to varying definitions across the federal courts. 
Numerous cases routinely des_cribe the right of access as a 
"pervasive ... right to inspect and copy public records and 
documents, including judicial records and documents.';246 This 
right, "which antedates the Constitution ... is now beyond dis-
pute."247 But what defines a "judicial document?" The circuit 
courts developed a series of inconsistent answers to this ques-
tion.248 If a document was in fact filed, it was publicly avail-
able.249 
One court summarized the split among the circuits reg_ard-
ing the "judicial document" definition as follows: 
report prepared by a corporation because there were "myriad" laws and regula-
tions regarding corporate reporting and the public had alternative means of ac-
cessing the information). 
246. Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 
1993) (internal quotations omitted); see also San J9se Mercury -News, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dist. Court-N. Dist. (San Jose); 187 F.3d 1096, 1102--03 (9th Cir. 1999); Citizens 
First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F~3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995); Pansy v. Borough 
of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1994); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt 
Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 
F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d l, 13 (1st Cir. 
1986); Bank ofAm. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assoc., 800 F.2d 
339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 
1165, 1177-78 (6th Cir. 1983). 
247. Leucadia, 998 F.2d at 161 (internal quotations omitted). 
248. See Doe v. Blue Cross Blue Shield ofMd., 103 F. Supp. 2d 856, 857 n.l (D. 
Md. 2000) (noting that "the consensus among other Courts of Appeal is that the 
documents must in some way have been filed with the court"). The Doe court fur· 
ther found that ''[a]ny party, or the public at large, may of course seek access to 
documents filed with the Court." Id. at n.2. Other courts, on the other hand, held 
that material becomes a judicial document "when a .court uses it in determining 
litigants' substantive rights_.'~ West Virginia v. Moore, 902 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D. 
W.Va. 1995) (quoting In re Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., Nos. 94-2254 & 94-23411995, 
WL 541623 (4th Cir. Sept. 13, 1995)); see also Cryovac, 805 F.2d at 13 ( "[T]he 
common law presumption does not encompass discovery materials. The courts 
have not extended it beyond materials on which a court relies in determining the 
litigants' substantive rights."). 
249. Doe, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 857. In Doe, the parties conducted a significant 
amount of discovery without filing the documents with the court; the effect of the 
court's decision was that the intervenors were not permitted access to 20,000 
pages that had been exchanged but not filed. Id. 
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Some circuits adopt the view that any document on file with 
the court is a judicial document. Other circuits take the 
. . 
view that "the mere filing of a paper or document with the 
court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial docu-
ment subject to right of public access;" rather, the document 
must be "relevant to the performance of the judicial function 
and useful in the. judicial process." 250 
. 
b. Stage of the Proceeding 
The "judicial document" determination (and consequently 
the right of access under the common law approach) was in-
creasingly described in terms of the stage of the proceeding and 
the use made of the discovery information. Some courts con· 
eluded that the production of discovery, even absent any filing 
with the· court, produced a "weak" right of access which, by the 
time information was submitted with dispositive motions, was 
a strong right. Other courts based their "judicial document" 
finding on the "technical" question of simply whether the mate-
rial had been filed.25I 
Courts in the D.C. Circuit defined a judicial document ac--
cording to "the role it plays in the adjudicatory process."252 
Others described the common law right of access as subject to 
variable strength, based on its particular use in adjudica-
tion.253 On the other hand, in In re Adobe Systems,254 the dis-
250. Moore, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 717 (internal citations omitted). 
251. See, e.g., Pansy, 23 F.3d at 782. 
252. Jn reApplication of A.H. Belo Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d .. 47, 48 (D.D.C. 1999) 
(citing United States v. El-Sayegh, 131 F.3.d 158, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1997)). 
253. Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 184 F.R.D. 504, 505 
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
[A] "judicial document" [is] material filed with the cou~t that is "relevant 
to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial 
process." How strong a "presumption of access'' is accorded a document 
will vary with its role in the adjudicatory process. Evidence introduced 
at trial is given an "especially strong'; presumption of access. Likewise, a 
document submitted as the principal basis for a dispositive motion is · 
given a strong presumption .... Documents that play no role in the per-
formance of Article III functions, such as materials exchanged during 
discovery, are given no presumption of access. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also SEC v. Thestreet.com, 273 F.3d 222 (2d 
Cir~ 2001). The case, decided after the 2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) balancing, 
described the basic approach: 
[D]ocuments that play no role in the performance of Article III functions, 
such as. those passed between the parties in discovery, lie entirely beyond 
the presumption's reach and stand on a different footing than a motion 
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trict court, relying on Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
FTC,255 stated that the Sixth Circuit also holds that a ''public 
right of access attaches when a document is filed."256 The court 
described a continuum of access rights, noting the presumption 
of access is "'weakest regarding documents produced by a party 
or witness but not file-d with the court."257 The presumption is 
"stronger" when documents are filed, "stronger yet" when relied 
upon in a dispositive motion, and ~'strongest" when used in evi-
dence at triaJ.258 
3. Access Based on the Federal Rule.s 
Though a ''common law" rationale was often applied, cases 
decided between 198.0-2000 also included discussion of a pre-
sumption· of access to discovery material created by the combi-
nation of the Rule 5(d) filing requirement and the Rule 26 good 
cause provision. Courts, not surprisingly, recognized that the 
rules may both create access and deny or limit it. Conse-
quently, though noting the presumption for access, courts typi-
cally decided whether a Rule 5(d) right existed on the basis of 
whether the protective order was properly granted according to 
Rule 26(c). .. When no such protective order was in place, Rule 5 
alone provided access. · 
This was the conclusion in the leading case discussing the 
right of access under the FRCP. In In re "Agent Orange, '-259 a 
filed by a party seeking action by the court, or, indeed, than any other 
document which is presented to the court to invoke its power or affect its 
decisions.,, 
ld. at 232 (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1050 (2d ·Cir. 1995)) 
(emphasis in original). The testimony in question "did not directly affect an adju· 
dication nor does it significantly determine litigants' substantive rights. To this 
extent, the documents are similar to material related to settlement discussions 
and documents, which we have concluded do not carry a presumption of public ac-
cess .  " ld. at 233 (internal quotations and citations omitted) .. 
254. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 141 F~R.D. 155 (N~D. CaL 1992) .. 
255. 710 F.2d 116'5 (6th Cir. 1983). 
256. In re Adobe Sys., 141 F.R.D. at 160. 
257. Id. at 157 (emphasis added). 
258. ld. at 157-58. 
259. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 104 F.R.D. 559, 568 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F!2d 13.9, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1987); see .a.ls.o In re Coordi-
nated Pretrial Proceeding in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101 F.R.D. 
34, 41 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that the rules- create a right "as to filed documents 
that have never been submitted into evidence, read into the record or submitted 
in connection with a pretrial motion" but that "the public access interest is rela · 
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class of Vietnam veterans brought a product liability action 
against private and governmental defendants.260 Judge George 
C. Pratt entered an order permitting the private defendants to 
file under seal any records containing "confidential develop-
mental, business, research or commercial information."26I A 
blanket order with respect to all documents and depositions in 
the case was then entered by the special master overseeing dis-
covery, who found good cause for his order based upon the 
case's "complexity," "emotionalism," and the "number of docu~ 
ments yet to be reviewed."262 Government documents, includ-
ing medical records, were made subject to a separate order.263 
The court ordered a partial lifting of the protective orders 
based upon the use of portions of the discovery material in 
summary judgment motions.264 The court then treated. what it 
referred to as "the raw fruits of discovery,"265 concluding that 
the federal rules presumptively make discovery open, subject 
only to the Rule 26 good cause standard.266 Rule 5(d) mandates 
that all discovery material be filed with the court unless the 
court orders otherwise because "such materials are sometimes 
of interest to those who may have no access to them except by a 
requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants 
similarly situated, or the public generally."267 No good cause 
had be.en demonstrated, and the material was released.268 
Similarly~ in In re Consumers Power Co., the court pro-
vided a thorough discussion of Rule 5(d), shortly after the 1980 
tively weak and is grounded only in the Federal Rules it does not derive from 
either the first amendment or the common law"). 
260. In re ''Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
261. In re '"Agent Orange," 104 F.R.D. at 563. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. 
264. Id. at 564. 
265. ld. at 565.. 
266. I d. at 567. 
. . . . 
267. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (1982) advisory committee's note (Rule 5(d) amended 
1991 & 2000). "Of course, federal district courts may adopt local rules that direct 
the parties not to file discovery materials except on order of the court .... Thus, 
both Rule 26(c) and Rule 5(d) require that discovery is presumptively open to pub-
lic scrutiny unless a valid protective order directs otherwise.'" In re "Agent Or-
ange," 104 F.R.D. at 568 (emphasis in original). 
268. Some of the protective orders were entered on the basis of factors that are 
not part of the Rules definition of good cause (i.e. ''complexity," "emotionalism," 
and the "number of documents yet to be reviewed"). In re "Agent Orange,'; 104 
F.R.D~ at 563. 
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amendment.269 The court noted that "a deposition is_ a public 
document freely open to inspection after it is filed with the 
clerk."270 Recognizing that the 1980 amendments to Rule 5(d) 
permitted the court to preclude filing, and the local rules 
merely delayed filing, the. court state.d that the local rules were 
intended to address "serious problems of storage" and not to 
"reduce third party access to pretrial discovery ."271 
The Advisory Committee Notes acknowledge the interests of 
those who may have no access to them except by a require· 
ment of filing, such as members of a class, litigants simi-
larly situated, or the public generally. Accordingly, this 
amendment and a change in Rule 30(f)(l) continue the re-
quirement of filing .... 272 
In Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.,273 another widely 
cited case, access to discovery information was sought to dis-
covery materials not previously designated as. confidential. 
The court equated the filing requirement of Rule 5(d) with the 
right of access and discussed contrary local rules: 
Under Local Rule 16(g), the parties to this case were ... ex-
cused from filing discovery materials in court. The effect of 
this nonfiling was to deny the public the right it would oth-
269. In re Consumers Power Co. Sec. Litig., 109 F.R.D. 45, 50 (E.D. Mich. 
1985). The court, as in many cases, granted the press standing to intervene for 
the purpose of seeking access. ld. at 51. 
270. ld. at 50. 
271. ld .. (internal quotation omitted). 
272. Id. (internal quotation omitted); accord Leary v~ Geoghan, Nos . .99-0371 & 
9'9·1109, .2001 WL 1902393 at *6 (M·ass. Super. Nov. 26, 2001). 
I d. 
As discussed earlier in this decision, Rule 5(d)(l) of the Massachusetts 
Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires parties to file Rule 33(a) 
and Rule 36 discovery. Rule 5( d)(2) provides that depositions and Rule 
34 discovery will not be filed unless the court otherwise orders. The 
purpose of Rule 5( d)(2) is not to imbue a party with a general privilege of 
non-disclosure of depositions and Rule 34 discovery; but rather was en· 
acted for administrative purposes only namely, to .ease the paper stor· 
age burden in the offices of the clerks of courts. The plain language of 
Rule 5( d)(2) makes it abundantly clear that the storage space problems 
should not trump the right of the public to request that depositions and 
Rule 34 discovery be filed. In fact, the rule provides that a citizen may 
request, and the court should consider~ whether depositions and Rule 34 
discovery should be filed in all public case files, not in just a particular 
case. 
273. 858 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1988). 
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erwise have had to inspect freely the discovery materials in 
this case, because the materials were not kept in any pub-
licly accessible location .... Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
noted that parties have general first amendment freedoms 
with regard to information gained through discovery and 
that, absent a valid court order to the contrary, they are en-
titled to disseminate the information as they see fit.274 
Because the case had settled, court was without jurisdiction to 
require the parties to file discovery material sought by the in-
tervenors,275 but the court permitted them to seek modification 
of the protective order based on the presumption of access aris-
ing solely from Rule 26(c).276 If good cause was not shown, the 
discovery material may be open for inspection by anyone. Any 
other result would negate the clear Ru~e 26 requirement for a 
protective order.277 
San Jose Mercury News, decided on the eve of the 2000 
amendment to Rule 5(d), expressly found the federal rules-
based right sufficient to unseal discovery material protected by 
stipulation of the parties.278 The district court permitted dis-
274. Id. at 780 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31~36 
(1984)). 
275. Id. at 781. 
276. Id. at 789. 
277. Id. (citing In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 821 F.2d 139, 
145-46 (2d Cir. 1987). United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 
421, 426 (W.D.N.Y. 1981), echoed this. 
Use of the discovery fruits disclosed in one lawsuit in connection with other litiga· 
tion, and even in collaboration among plaintiffs' attorneys, comes squarely within 
the purposes of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. . . . We perceive no intention 
. . 
in the Federal Rules that incidental benefits of liberal federal discovery should not 
accrue to litigants in state courts who are pursuing ancillary lawsuits, provided 
there is no attempt to exploit the federal litigation discovery process solely to as· 
sist litigation in a foreign forum. 
Id. See also United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. 
Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1158-60 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that federal 
rules create presumption of access to civil discovery materials sufficient to satisfy 
False Claims Act provision barring qui tam actions based on publicly disclosed 
information); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980); Am. 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F:2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1978); Doe v. William 
Shapiro, Esquire, P.C., 852 F. Supp. 1256, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("The filing of a 
document with the court gives rise to a presumptive right of public access."); In re 
Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 101 
F.R.D. 34, 38-41 (C.D. Cal. 1984). 
278. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court-N. Dist. (San Jose), 187 
F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). The case involved a sexual harassment suit 
·brought by two Mountain View, California, female police officers. The defendants 
conducted an investigation of the claim and after the suit was brought resisted 
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covery of defendants' internal report and also entered a protec-
tive order, stipulated by the parties, apparently without a 
showing of good caus-e.279 After granting intervention, the ap-
pellate court acknowledg-ed the newspaper's right of access 
based on the federal common law., and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; however, the court left the issue of whether 
the First Amendment was applicable to a prejudgment right of 
access to court records for another day. 280 
''It is well-established that the fruits of pretrial discovery 
are, in the absence of a court order to the contrary, presump· 
tively public. Rule 26(c) authorizes a district court to override 
this presumption where 'good cause' is shown."281 
D. From 2000-2006 
While decisions during the period from 1980 through 2000 
often considered the right of access under three separate ra-
tionales the First Amendment, the FRCP, and the common 
law after 2000 this discussion has been largely displaced. The 
opportunity to examine pretrial information is increasingly 
constricted. 
Following Seattle Times, a First Amendment claim has no 
greater deference than the Rule 26(c) standard for granting a 
protective order.282 Courts also concluded that the 2000 
amendment's elimination of the filing requirement under Rule 
5(d) did away with any claim based on that rule. For instance, 
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Thestreet.com,283 the 
court held that there was no presumption of filing all discovery 
materials or public access to materials that were not filed.284 
disclosure of the report. Id. at 1098. 
279. Id. at 1098, 1103. 
280. Id. at 1102. ''We have expressly recognized that the federal common law 
right of access extends to pretrial documents filed in civil cases . ., . Other circuits 
have expressly recognized that the common law right reaches documents filed in 
connection with motions for summary judgment." Id. (internal citations omitted). 
281. Id. at 1103 (internal citations omitted). The court remanded the case to 
the district court to determine the propriety of the intervention. ld. 
282. See supra text accompanying notes 221---31. 
283. 273 F.3d 222 (2d Cir. 2001). 
284. Id. at 233, n.ll.· Further, the court stated that "the rule now prohibits the 
filing of certain discovery materials unless they are used in the proceeding or the 
court orders filing." Id. (emphasis in original). 
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To the contrary, Rule 5(d) now prohibited filing discovery ma-
terials in most instances.285 
Similarly, in Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, 
Inc.,286 the circuit court criticized the trial court's conclusion 
that documents filed with the court are judicial records and 
subject to access by the press.287 Notwithstanding that access 
to discovery material in the Bridgestone!Firestone litigation 
was sought in the district court prior to the 2000 amendment to 
Rule 5(d), the court concluded the filing requirement created no 
right of access.288 "The prospect of all discovery material being 
presumptively subject to the right of access would likely lead to 
an increased resistance to discovery requests."289 Although an 
argument can still be made that, absent a judicially-created 
protective order, discovery material is still open, that position 
appears weak. 
Cases after 2000, however, still grapple with various com-
mon law presumptions regarding access. Courts note that no 
presumption of access attaches to documents merely produced 
during discovery or used only with non-dispositive pretrial mo-
tions; such material is now not considered a "judicial docu-
ment," and consequently is not subject to the common law pre-
sumption of access.290 For instance, in Thestreet.com the court 
stated that: 
The Confidential Testimony is deposition discovery mate-
rial, which we have concluded are documents that play no 
role in the performance of Article III functions. The testi-
mony did not directly affect an adjudication nor does it sig-
nificantly determine litigants' substantive rights. To this 
extent, the documents are similar to material related to set-
tlement discussions and documents, which we have con-
cluded do not carry a presumption of public access. 291 
285. !d. 
286. 263 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001). 
287. Id. at 1312. 
288. Id. 
289. Id. at n.10. J 
290. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 
2002); Gulino v. Bd. of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New York, No. 96 Civ. 
8414 (CBM), 2003 WL 1878235, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ('"Judicial documents,' ... 
are items filed with the court that are relevant to the performance of the judicial 
function and useful in the judicial process."). 
291. SEC v. Thestreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 233 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations 
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The rise of agreed~upon "umbrella" protective orders, in 
conjunction with local rules excusing filing, has left significant 
amounts of material both under seal and un-filed.292 Third-
party access is increasingly available only upon intervention 
under Rule 24. In these circumstances, a good cause determi-
nation with respect to a specific document is not made until 
someone challenges the arrangement, and material is never 
filed until the case is subject to at least pre-trial motions. 
Third-parties, consequently, have few means other than 
knowledge of the action itself and their own speculation to dis-
cern whether information of public importance is being gener-
ated by a case. 
The Manual for Complex Litigation provides a clear de· 
scription of the procedures employed: 
Umbrella orders provide that all assertedly confidential ma-
terial disclosed (and appropriately identified, usually by 
stamp) is presumptively protected unless challenged. Such 
orders typically are made without a particularized showing 
to support the claim for protection, but such a showing must 
be made whenever a claim under an order is challenged.293 
If such material were both filed with the court and "protected" 
by virtue of nothing more than the parties own use of a stamp, 
the requirements of Rule 26(c) ,are effectively ignored. But the 
litigation most likely to include voluminous discovery and con-
sequently a willingness to permit the parties to exchange usu-
ally thousands of documents "under seal" without court in-
volvement will often be that in which the public interest is the 
highest. 
Bridgestone/Firestone illustrates this conundrum. ''[l]n 
what has become commonplace in the federal courts, the par-
ties stipulated to a protective order allowing each other to des-
ignate particular documents as confidential and subject to pro-
and quotations omitted). In denying access to material submitted with only pre~ 
trial motions in Phillips, the Ninth Circuit stated that "it makes little sense to 
render the district coures protective order useless simply hecause the plaintiffs 
attached a sealed discovery document to a nondispositive sanctions motion filed 
with the court." 307 F.3d at 1213. 
292. After 2000, this situation became the norm under amended Rule 5(d). 
FED .. R. CIV. P. 5(d) (2000) . 
293. FED. JUD. CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITlG. § 11.432 (4th ed. 2004). 
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tection under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)7."294 Dis-
covery in the case was not filed in accord with the court's local 
rules.295 The press (including the Washington Post, Los Ange-
les Times, and CBS Broadcasting) intervened under Rule 24 for 
the purpose of seeking access to materials obtained in discov-
ery.296 Here, however, every document produced in discovery 
had been submitted to the court in conjunction with pre .. trial 
motions. 297 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court conclusion 
that ''because the documents were filed with the court they are 
judicial records and therefore subject to the common-law right 
of access."298 
Such an approach does not distinguish between material 
filed with discovery motions and material filed in connection 
with more substantive motions. . . . The better rule is that 
material filed with discovery motions is hot subject to the 
common-law right of access, whereas discovery material 
filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judi-
cial resolution of the merits is subject to the common-law 
right, and we so hold. This means that the Firestone docu-
ments filed in connection with motions to compel discovery 
are not subject to the common-law right of access.299 
Conversely, where pretrial material is submitted with a 
dispositive motion, the presumption favors access. In Lugosch 
v. Pyramid Company of Onondaga,300 the appellate court de-
scribed such discovery material as subject to the ''highest" pre-
sumption of access.30I In reversing the district court, the cir-
cuit court held that the availability of such documents is 
presumed upon filing; it was not proper for the district court to 
hold resolution of the access decision in "abeyance" pending the 
resolution of the summary judgment motion.302 While Lugosch 
294. Chicago Tribune, Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1307 
(11th Cir. 2001). 
295. !d. at 1308 (citing S.D. Ga. L.R. 26.6). 
296. !d. 
297. ld. at 1312. The court found it "significant" that the material had been 
submitted with these motions entirely by the plaintiffs, and not at all by Fire-
stone. Id. 
298. !d. 
299. Id. at 1312-13. 
300. 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006). 
30 l. I d. at 123. 
302. Id. at 126. The court further refused to conclude that documents submit-
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allowed access to material when used to support a judicial de--
termination on the merits of a case, even this has been nar-
rowed in other cases. Some courts have looked to ·whether the 
summary judgment motion was denied, thereby postponing the 
merits decision of the case, and concluded that in such in-
stances the presumption is not as strong.303 
Even more restrictively, the Second Circuit established a 
"gene.ral and strong presumption against access to documents 
sealed under protective order when there was reasonable reli-
ance upon such an order'' in Thestreet.com.304 The court 
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the protective or-
der in this case was a privately agreed upon umbrella order 
lacking a.ny judicial determination of good cause.305 This sug-
gests that private parties, in furthering their own interests, 
may bar public inspection. 
ted with a summary judgment motion might receive different weights of presump· · 
tion "based on the extent to which they were relied upon in resolving the motion." 
ld. at 123 (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum. Products 
Antitrust Litig., 101 F.R.D. 34, 43 (C.D. Cal. 1984)) ("If the rationale behind ac-
cess is to allow the public an opportunity to assess the correctness of the judge's 
decision . . . documents that the judge should have considered or relied upon, but 
did not, are just as deserving of disclosure as those that actually entered into the 
judge's decision."). See also id. (citing F'l'C v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 
F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir. 1987)) ("Once those submissions come to the attention of 
the district judge, they can fairly be assumed to play a role in the court's delibera-
t1ons. . . ") 
303. See In re NBC Universal Inc., 426 F.Supp. 2d. 49, 53-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995) ('Where a 
district court denied the summary judgment motion, essentially postponing .a final 
determination of substantive legal rights, the public interest in ~ccess is not as 
pressing.'')); United States v. Graham, 257 F.:3d 143, 151 (2d Cir. 2001) ('~Con· 
versely the presumption of access to documents that do not serve as the basis for a 
substantive determination-such as documents submitted on a motion for sum-
mary judgment which is denied, thus leaving a decision on the merits for another 
day-is appreciably weaker."). 
304~ SEC v. Thest:r;eet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 231 (2d Cir. 2001). See also Bayer 
AG and Miles, Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 162 F.R.D~ 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quot-
ing Palmieri v. New York, 779 F.2d 861, 866 (2d Cir. 1985)); Crothers v. Pilgrim 
Mortgage Corp., No. 95 CIV. 4681(SAS), 1997 WL 570583, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
11, 1997) ("[T]he Martindell standard should not apply where a private non-party 
asserts its own interests to modify a sealing order for at least two reasons."). 
305. TheStreet.com; 27:3 F.3d at 225 ("Under the October 2000 Order, each 
party had the right to designate material as 'confidential information' if it be· 
lieved in good faith that the material should be so classified."). While the court 
' ' 
recognized the potential for conflicting presumptions when a party "reasonably 
relies'; on discovery material subject to a protective order but later attaches it to a 
dispositive motion, it avoided this issue, concluding that the parties in this case 
had not reasonably relied on the protective order. Id. at 234. 
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Other courts, however, have not gone this far. In Diversi-
fied Group v. Daugerdas,306 the media sought access to docu-
ments, including deposition testimony, submitted under seal by 
both sides in support of and ·opposing summary judgment mo-
tions.307 The defendants objecte·d to granting access to the ma-
terial. The court disagreed, holding that when the materials 
are submitted to the Court for making a judicial determination 
the presumption regarding discovery materials shifts.308 
A comparable exception to denying access has been carved 
out for similarly situated parallel litigants, traditionally al-
lowed access to pretrial information. In In re Enron Corpora-
tion Securities, Derivative & "ERISA" Litigation,309 the court 
dealt with access presumptions in light of modern electronic fil-
ing methods. Enron-related cases were consolidated under the 
Multi-District Litigation transfer statute, which included the 
establishment of a litigation website (the "ESL" website), ac-
cessible only by parties to the case and which served as an ele,c-
tronic repository of "depositions and related exhibits."310 The 
Texas State Board of Public Accountancy, charged by statute 
with "investigating alleged audit failures that may have led to 
Enron's collapse" moved to intervene in the case to gain access 
to discovery material after "some accountants . . . refused to 
provide . . . copies, based on the Court's confidentiality or-
ders."311 The court noted that pretrial discovery m,aterial car-
ries no presumption of access and that the parties had relied 
upon the court's standing orders regarding the confidentiality 
of material on the ESL website.312 Nor had the documents 
sought by the Texas board been filed with the court or submit-
ted to the court in support of motions or rulings by the court.313 
Intervention by the Texas board, which would have the effect of 
granting the Board access to the ESL website and consequently 
306. 304 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
307. ld. at 510. 
308. ld. at 515 (citing Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98 Civ. 
8520 BSJ MHD, 2000 WL 60221, at *5 (S~D .  N.Y. Jan. 25, 2000) (noting an excep-
tion to the rule regarding the presumption that attaches to discovery documents 
·. . . 
where the documents are included in summary judgment motion papers submit-
ted to the court) (''Moreover, the Court relied upon all the materials submitted to 
it in rendering its opinion on the summary judgment motion.")). ld. 
309. 229 F.R.D. 126 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
310. Id. at 128. 
. . 
311. ld. 
312. Id. at 128-29. 
313. ld. at 128, n.5. 
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all depositions in the case, was granted because a more ~'flexi­
ble" approach regarding intervention was required.314 "[T]he 
fruits of pretrial discovery are, in the absence of a court order 
to the contrary, presumptively public/'315 Consequently, the 
Board was granted access by virtue of intervention.316 How-
ever, while the Texas Board was permitted to intervene as par .. 
allel litigants, the board was also made subject to the existing 
confidentiality orders, ess:entially continuing to shield the in-
. . 
formation from any general public access. 317 
In Foltz v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co.,318 the 
district court had sealed the files and removed the entire litiga-
tion from the court's computer system.3I9 The circuit court ad-
dressed the motions for access by third parties, including a 
public interest group, contesting two protective orders.320 One 
protective order was a privately agreed upon blanket order 
treating all discovery material as confidential.321 The appellate 
court remanded, instructing the district court to "require State 
Farm to show good cause under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
26(c) for continuing protection against the collateral litigants of 
materials produced in discovery but not made part of the court 
record. "322 
CONCLUSION 
Beginning in 1991, Rule 5 authorized district courts to 
adopt local rules permitting filing by fax.323 In 1993, the rule 
was amended to allow filing by any electronic means, not just 
' fax.324 Early on, few courts authorized electronic filing.325 The 
314. /d.at 131. 
315. Id. at 131 (quoting San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court N. 
. . 
Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cit. 1999)). 
316. Id. 
317. Id. 
318. 331 F~3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). 
319. Id. at 1128. 
320. ld. at 1138. The-ftrst order concerned "the very narrow issue of whether 
plaintiffs counsel should be disqualified." Id. 'The court upheld the order, recog-
nizing that the material was subject to the attorney-client privilege and stating 
that "[w]e see no conceivable policy reason to serve up such information on a sil-
ver platter." Id. 
321. ld. 
322. Id. at 1139. 
323. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e) (1992); 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE§ 5.31(l][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2005). 
324. FED. R. CIV. P. 5(e) (2000). 
• 
• 
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federal courts are now rapidly being equipped with technology 
that can accommodate electronic filing.326 Effective December 
2006, Rule 5 was amended to authorize. electronic filing of all 
papers.327 
The Advisory Committee commented on this change: 
·"Amended Rule 5(e) acknowledges that many courts hav·e re-
quired electronic filing by means of a standing order, proce-
dures manual, or local rule. These local practices reflect the 
advantages that courts and most litigants realize from elec-
tronic filing.''328 
The Case Management/Electronic Case Files ("CM/ECF') 
system gives federal courts the ability to maintain electronic 
cas.e files and offer electronic filing of court documents. 329 This 
system allows both attorneys and the public to view court 
dockets and case files online. 330 Each court determines for it-
self to whom it will issue filing logins and passwords.33I Al-
though individuals may not be allowed to file. on CM/ECF,-they 
may still be able to view CM/ECF files through the Public Ac-
cess to Court Electronic Records ("PACER") program.332 How-
ever, some courts restrict online viewing as well.333 
The implementation of electronic filing in the federal 
courts produces marked advantages over paper filing.334 Elec-
325. MOORE ET AL., supra note 322, § 5.31[2][a]. 
326. ld~· 
327. Supreme Court Approves Rule Changes on E-Discovery, Unpublished 
Opinion Citation, 74 U.S. L. WK. 2617 (2006). 
328. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/comment2005/CV_Rule_5e. pdf (last visited Feb. 
18, 2007). On April 12, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court submitted amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Congress. See http://www.supremecourt 
us.gov/orders/courtorders/ftcv06p.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). 
329. CMIECF Frequently Asked Questions, www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecf_ 
faqs.html (last visited Feb~ 18, 2007)~ 
330. Id. 
331. Id. 
332. ld. 
333. MOORE ET AL., supra note 8, § 5.31[7][c]. Courts do not have to make files 
available online, as long as the public is able to physically access records from the 
courthouse. ld. § 5.34[3][d]. 
334. LEONIDAS MECHAM~ ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ELECTRONIC 
CASE FILES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF GOALS, 
ISSUES, AND THE ROAD AHEAD 3 (1997) (Discussion Draft), http://www.uscourts. 
gov/casefiles/ecfmar97.pdf. Problems noted with the paper filing system included 
the following: paper files are cumbersome to organize, difficult to retrieve quickly, 
and are subject to the access limitations of normal business hours; paper files are 
usually only available to one person at a time, limiting the ability of a panel of 
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tronic filing improves judge, court staff, and public access to 
case files; decreases court costs through increased productivity 
and efficiency; reduces physical handling, maintenance, and 
copying of files; improves docketing, scheduling, case manage-
ment, and statistical reporting; and enhances accuracy and ef-
ficiency in record maintenance.335 Furthermore, the newly 
adopted amendments to the civil rules will increase efficiency 
in the discovery of electronically stored information.336 
Prior to implementing CM/ECF, the Judicial Conference 
studied privacy and public access issues relevant to electronic 
filing. The concern regarding privacy was that court partici-
pants would be subject to an increased risk of "identity theft, 
stalking, and predatory business practices" due to the ease of 
access and increase in accessible information.337 To address 
this concern, the Judicial Conference had its Committee on 
Court Administration and Case Management examine issues 
relating to privacy and public access to electronic case files.338 
The committee, through its Subcommittee on Privacy and Pub-
lic Access to Electronic Case Files, began its study in June 1999 
and received information from experts and academics in the 
privacy arena, as well as judges, clerks, and government agen-
judges of their clerks to access or work on files at home; and paper files require 
multiple copies to file, distribute, maintain and store, all of which must be done 
manually with a risk that files will be lost or misfiled. ld. 
335. Judge Arthur Monty Ahalt, JusticeLINK, Prince George's County, Mary-
land Electronic Filing Pilot, http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSC/TIS/TIS99/ 
CTC6/JudgesSuper/CTC6SuperEfiling.htm Oast visited Jan. 17, 2003) (on file 
with author). 
336. Id. 
337. Witnesses Advocate Balanced Approach For Federal Courts' Document Ac-
cess Plan, 69 U.S. L. WK. 2576 (2001). In 2005, an article analyzed the state of 
electronic filing in the U.S. federal courts and offered judges advice on handling 
electronic filing. David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, http://www.fclr.org/articles/2005fedctslrevl(noframes).htm. 
The article addressed the tension between secrecy and public access regarding 
electronically filed discovery. ld. at 30. Isom did not address whether discovery 
material must be filed; rather, he emphasized that courts must balance the com-
peting interests of secrecy and access. Id. at 31. Because of electronic filing, 
"[l]itigants will be even more reluctant to file information that they know may be-
come instantly accessible and distributable throughout the world. The press, the 
public and information vendors will also find the information more valuable and 
useful. Courts will be asked to be the arbiters of these intense competing inter-
ests." ld. 
338. Jud .Conf. Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Mgmt., Report on Privacy 
and Public Access to Electronic Case Files (2001), http://www.privacy.uscourts.gov/ 
Policy.htm [hereinafter Judicial Committee Report]. 
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cies. 339 The subcommittee re_commended that documents in 
civil case files be made available electronically to the same ex-
tent that they are available at the courthouse.340 The Judicial 
Conference has adopted these recommendations, but they are 
not binding on the courts. 341 The experience of those courts 
that have been making their case file information available 
through PACERNet is that there have been virtually nd re-
ported privacy problems as a result.''342 CM/ECF systems are 
now in use in 89% of federal courts, including 88 of the 94 dis-
trict courts.343 
These technological changes make clear that issues _about 
access to pretrial information gathered by discovery should be 
evaluated on the merits, not on the basis of spurious claims of 
burden upon clerks' offices. There can be honest disagreement 
on whether the public should have access to this information. 
My view is that legitimate concerns about privacy, business in-
terests, and other considerations may be dealt with by federal 
courts in the same manner as they now routinely handle these 
issues under protective order requests. Unfortunately, the 
2000 amendment to Rule 5(d) has short circuited this debate. 
We should now move toward reasoned arguments to decide this 
important question. 
339. Id. 
340. !d. However, the subcommittee recommended that Social Security cases 
be excluded from electronic access and that personal identifiers (such as social se-
_curity numbers, dates of birth, financial account numbers, and na,mes of minors) 
be modified or partially redacted. Id. 
341. About CM/ECF, supra note 329. 
342. Judicial Committee Report, supra note 338. 
343. About CM/ECF, supra note 329. 
